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ABSTRACT
This research has two objectives: firstly, to examine the application of life
cycle costing in the United States; and secondly, to discuss its potential for use
in the decision making of the Australian Defense Forces. It has been found
that despite almost 30 years of application in the United States, life cycle cost
for the most part, is given little real attention in decision making. Reasons for
this include: an institutional emphasis that accords greater attention to
acquisition cost than life cycle cost; and the dominance of a budgeteers view of
life cycle cost as a technique for affordability analysis, an approach which the
current state of the data does not readily support. Life cycle cost's greatest
potential is as a criteria to evaluate and tradeoff design and logistics issues, but
it receives comparatively little emphasis in the U.S. in these areas. For
Australia to avoid the problems experienced in the U.S., there needs to be
acceptance at all levels of the concept of life cycle cost, and what it is trying to
achieve. Since the cornerstone of the techniques of life cycle cost analysis is
the data, an accounting system capable of capturing direct and indirect costs is
needed. This study contains seven broad points for Australia to consider in
implementing the techniques and concept of life cycle cost.
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L INTRODUCTION
On 24 May 1989 the Chief of the Australian Defense Forces, General P.C.
Gration directed that:
procedures [be instituted ] which will allow consideration of appropriate
Life Cycle Costs in the decision making process associated with the
acquisition of equipments and weapon systems. [Ref. 1]
Up to this point the major considerations in the acquisition decisions of
the Australian Defense Forces had been the trade off of performance
considerations with acquisition cost.
A. THE CONCEPT OF LIFE CYCLE COST AS A DECISION TOOL
What differentiates Life Cycle Cost (LCC) as a decision making tool is its
consideration of the total costs of ownership of a system over its life cycle.
Thus it is a womb to tomb concept which includes the consideration of:
e Research and development (R&D) cost-The cost of feasibility
studies; system analyses; detail design and development,
fabrication, assembly, and test of engineering models; initial system
test and evaluation; and associated documentation.
e Production and construction cost-the cost of fabrication, assembly,
and test of operational systems (production models); operation and
maintenance of the production capability; and associated initial
logistic support requirements (e.g., test and support equipment
development, spare/repair parts provisioning, technical data
development, training, entry of items into the inventory, facility
construction, etc. )
e Operation and maintenance cost-the cost of sustaining operation,
personnel and maintenance support, spare/repair parts and related
inventories, test and support equipment maintenance,
transportation and handling, facilities, modifications and technical
data changes, and so on.
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System retirement and phase out cost-the cost of phasing the
system out of the inventory due to obsolescence or wear out, and
subsequent equipment item recycling and reclamation as
appropriate. [Ref. 2:p. 19]
Having defined life cycle cost in this way however, the costs of retirement
and phaseout are rarely considered unless disposal is known to be particularly
expensive as, for example, it might be with a nuclear power plant. Thus, the
prime differential between the life cycle cost and traditional costing
approaches is its consideration of operation and support costs.
Typically the costs of operation and support over a systems life cycle
outweigh its acquisition cost, and account for 50 to 75 percent of total life cycle
cost. This has become increasingly so even as the unit acquisition cost of
military hardware has risen. In fact, higher unit costs have resulted in even
higher operating and support costs as systems have become increasingly
complex and less reliable [Ref. 3]. With a finite defense dollar available one
consequence of this is to decrease the funds available for other uses. As a
decision making tool therefore, life cycle cost analysis is concerned with the
future consequences of present day decisions on the use of scarce resources
[Ref. 4]. It is intended to allow decisions to make better use of these resources.
The breadth of the decisions for which life cycle costing can be used is
succinctly summarized by Earles:
Life cycle costing is a costing discipline, a procurement technique, an
acquisition consideration and a tradeoff tool. As a costing discipline it is
primarily concerned with operating and support (O&S) cost-estimating
methods. As a procurement technique it is concerned with minimizing
total life costs for component procurements. As an acquisition
consideration its primary concerns are source selection and the balancing
of acquisition and ownership costs. As a tradeoff tool its primary
concerns are repair levels and the impact of specific design features on
operating and support costs. [Ref. 5:p. 5]
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Thus, life cycle cost is not only an analytical method that can be used to
quantify and tradeoff costs, it is also a concept that aims to influence decisions
to be favorable to reducing the total costs over a systems life cycle.
B. COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS TO LIFE CYCLE COST
1. Life Cycle Cost and Design to Cost
Complementary to life cycle cost is the concept of design to cost. Both
are management strategies aimed at ensuring affordable weapon systems are
acquired by the military services. In design to cost, design parameters and cost
goals are imposed on design. The cost can be acquisition or life cycle cost.
When it is life cycle cost, parameters for operating and support costs as well as
sailaway or flyaway cost are included. Although life cycle costing and design
to life cycle cost are complementary, they are not the same. As was will be
discussed in Chapter II, life cycle cost is one side of the cost versus
effectiveness tradeoff of cost effectiveness analysis. Design to cost on the other
hand, is not concerned with the optimal life cycle cost effective solution,
because the design for such a solution may be above the affordable cost ceiling
[Ref. 6:p. 4].
2. Life Cycle Cost and Integrated Logistic Support
Integrated logistic support is defined by the U.S. Department of
Defense Directive 5000.39, Acquisition and Management of Integrated Logistic
Support for Systems and Equipment, as being:
A disciplined, unified and iterative approach to management and
technical activities necessary to:
a. Integrate support considerations into system and equipment
design.
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b. Develop support requirements that are related consistently to
readiness objectives, to design, and to each other.
c. Acquire the required support.
d. Provide the required support during the operational phase at
minimum cost. [Ref. 7:p. 2-2]
As a discipline, ILS is concerned with many of the same issues as life cycle
cost. It attempts to influence design and acquisition decisions in terms of
supportability, and provide a support infrastructure that achieves the
required balance between cost and effectiveness. One way to view the
relationship between ILS and life cycle cost is that life cycle cost provides a
readily understandable quantifiable measure of the effect of logistics concerns.
From this view, life cycle cost can be seen as an aspect of ILS.
C. Categories of Cost
In discussions of cost, cost is often categorized in to three broad groupings.
These are either:
* Rect ring and Non-Recuring Costs. Non-recuring costs are those that are
only incured once, or infrequently at irregular periods within a specified
time frame. The costs of research and development (R&D) and
production, are non recuring costs in the lifecycle of a system, as are the
costs of providing the initial ILS to a program. Recuring costs are those
that occur regularly and frequently. The costs of operating and support
are recuring costs.
* Fixed, Variable and Semi-Variable Costs. Fixed costs, at least in the short
term, are unchanged with the level of activity. Variable costs on the
other hand, exhibit a direct relationship with the level of activity. To
these, a hybrid category of cost called semi-variable costs must also be
added. Semi-variable costs change with the level of activity but not in
direct response to those changes. Most fixed costs if viewed over a long
enough time frame are actually semi-variable costs. In the operating and
support costs, variable costs, for example, include the costs of fuel, depot
maintenance, and spare parts. Fixed costs include base and facilities
operations, and many administrative functions. However, over time
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these can be varied with the level of activity, and are therefore, also
semi-variable costs.
* Direct and Indirect Cost. Direct costs are those that are traceable to an
activity. Indirect costs are shared costs and can not be directly attributed
to any one activity. This division is largely for reasons of practicality. All
costs should be traceable, however it is often not convenient to do so.
The term overhead is commonly used to group all indirect costs. In
accounting practice, rules are developed to allocate overhead in a
consistent and reasonable way to activities.
There is considerable overlap in the categories of cost, direct costs for
example, can be both fixed and variable, and fixed costs can be recurring costs.
These terms will appear throughout this study.
D. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
If the Australian Defense Forces are to use life cycle costing as a decision
making tool, a thorough understanding of the techniques and process is
required. The United States (U.S.) Department of Defense have have been
using life cycle costing for over 30 years, and much can be gained for Australia
in examini- g the ways it has been implemented in the U.S. However, life
cycle costing is not without its problems or critics in the U.S. This thesis will
examine the ways life cycle costing has been applied in the United States,
what the fundamental characteristics of a process that uses life cycle costing
are, and what problems and criticisms there are with its application. Having
learnt from the U.S. experience, it is intended to apply this experience to
discuss some broad issues with the implementation of life cycle costing into
the decision making of the Australian Defense Forces. Thus, the purpose of
this study is two fold: to examine and reach conclusions on life cycle costing
in the U.S., and to apply these conclusions to issues with the implementation
of life cycle cost analysis to Australia.
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E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In concert with the purpose for this study, the primary research question
with which It will be concerned is: what are the essential issues to consider in
the application of life cycle costing to the decision making of the Australian
Defense Forces? In the course of answering this question the following
subsidiary research questions will also be addressed:
" What are the principle characteristics of a life cycle cost analysis
approach to decision making?
" How and with what success is life cycle costing used in the U.S.
Department of Defense, and what criticisms are there of it?
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this study consists of an extensive review of
current literature including texts, journal articles, theses, reports and Service
directives. In addition, personal interviews were held with people involved
in life cycle costing, its conduct and management in the U.S. The interviews
focused on people in three areas: those involved in the Navy and at the Office
of the Secretary of Defense in preparing and reviewing life cycle cost
estimates, personnel in current USN programs-the SSN 21 SFAWOLF
submarine and CG 47 AEGIS ship, and with contractors who have had
extensive experience in life cycle costing. The emphasis is on the U.S. Navy
because it is the Navy with which this author is most familiar, and
additionally, because in the literature it is the Navy which is least
represented, particularly in the application of life cycle costing to ships and
ship systems.
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G. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study is primarily concerned with the process of life cycle costing as it
applies to major weapon systems acquisition, the way life cycle cost analysis is
used, and the problems and limitations of its use. It will consider the
application of life cycle costing to all aspects of major weapons system
acquisition. Its intended to discuss the principles of life cycle costing by way of
introduction and understanding, rather than as a detailed examination of the
methodology. However, where methodology is a problem these limitations
will be examined in detail.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This study is divided into three chapters in addition to this general
introduction and a conclusion. Chapter II is a discussion of the process of life
cycle cost analysis. This chapter will provide a general analysis approach as a
framework to discuss some of the broad issues in life cycle costing and
introduce the reader to the concepts and techniques of life cycle cost analysis.
In Chapter III the regulations and organizations in the U.S. responsible for life
cycle cost will be examined and conclusions reached on the approach taken to
life cycle costing in the U.S. Also, in chapter III some of the issues, limitations
and problems encountered in the practice of life cycle cost will be examined.
To complement this chapter, an appendix with two brief case studies: the
SSN21 SEAWOLF submarine, and the F/A 18 HORNET aircraft will be used
to illustrate the different approaches to life cycle costing. The conclusions
reached from the examination of life cycle cost in the U.S. in Chapter III and
the appendix will be applied as lessons learnt in Chapter IV, to discuss some
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of the issues with the application of life cycle costing into the decision making
of the Australian Defense Forces. Chapters II, and IIl will provide answers to
the subsidiary research questions of this study, and Chapter IV will answer
the primary research question that has been posed.
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II. THE PROCESS OF LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
This chapter will provide an overview and context for the concept of life
cycle cost as a decision making tool. The relevance of the points brought out
in this chapter will be enlarged upon in the following chapter where the
current state of life cycle costing in the U.S. Department of Defense will be
examined. This chapter can be thought of as the theory, and the following
chapter the practice of life cycle cost. This chapter will examine life cycle cost
generically, looking at its principles of application. It will deal with the
essential factors influencing an equipment's life cycle cost, and the
methodology and models for measuring cost. To illustrate the principles of
life cycle cost analysis, it will be discussed in the context of a general analysis
approach. This approach is represented diagrammatically at Figure 1, and will
provide a framework for examining the major requirements and issues of life
cycle cost analysis. The discussion of this chapter is keyed to the flow of the
analysis at Figure 1. Life cycle cost analysis is an iterative process. Once an
initial analysis had been done, it is likely that all or parts of the process will be
revisited and revised, and the objectives of the analysis reviewed. This is the
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Sensitivity Construct new model
Uncertainty I Run model
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Figure 1. Life Cycle Cost Analysis Process
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A. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
1. The Objectives of Management Decisions Using Life Cycle Cost
Analysis.
The introductory chapter to this study defined life cycle cost as a
decision making tool that is concerned with the future consequences of
present day decisions. A life cycle cost approach therefore, can be applied to
almost any decision that will have an effect on resource use in the future. In
its application to decisions concerning weapons system acquisition, life cycle
cost's four principal uses are:
Affordability Analysis. To determine which approach, amongst a range
of alternatives, provides the required capability to meet a mission need
at least overall cost, and whether this cost is affordable in terms of
expected future budgetary flows.
" Detailed Design. To determine the optimal level of reliability,
maintainability and supportability of the design. (These terms will be
defined and discussed in the next section) Such decisions concern the
balance of the costs of automation, accessibility and quality of
components with their life cycle cost savings.
" Source Selection and Evaluation. When there are competing designs for
meeting a mission need, such as in procurement of developed
commercial systems, each design is analyzed in terms of its life cycle
costs. The process and criteria for evaluating the life cycle costs of
different developed designs in source selection are the same as when
using life cycle cost in detailed design. If life cycle cost is used in detailed
design, the designer is trying to incorporate in the design the life cycle
cost priorities of the customer. If used by the customer for source
selection, the customer is quantifying the effects of the designer's
decisions, and selecting the the system which best meets their life cycle
cost and effectiveness priorities.
" Logistics Support Decision Making. While logistics support decisions
will have to accord with the design selected, decisions concerning
maintenance policy, facilities, support equipment and spares should be
made based on their impact on life cycle costs.
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The different decisions for which life cycle cost analysis is used are
just different points along the same continuum. An analysis may start for
affordability, but over time be modified and refined to become the basis for an
analysis of logistic support decisions. However, the exact purpose for which
an analysis is to be used needs to be defined and understood because, as will
be discused latter, the requirements for the different types of analysis can be
different.
2. The O&S Cost Drivers-Factors That Influence Life Cycle Costs
Efforts to reduce cost in the future are concerned with identifying the
characteristics of a system that influence costs, and making tradeoffs early that
will result in future cost savings. The future cost savings which the
techniques of life cycle cost analysis are, for the most part concerned, are
savings in operation and support costs. The major costs in operating and
support are usually fuel, manpower, depot rework and spares. The system
characteristics that influence these and other elements of cost are called cost
drivers. In the analysis process the cost drivers need to be identified and their
effects emphasized.
Efforts at reducing operation and support costs usually center on
increasing a system's reliability and maintainability; where reliability is the
probability that an equipment will fail, and maintainability is the ease and
accuracy with which maintenance functions can be performed. Reliability and
maintainability are the most significant cost drivers because they have wide
ranging impact on the elements of operating and support cost. The reliability
of a system determines the number of corrective maintenance actions, and
maintainability the time required to repair it when it fails. These factors
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determine at what maintenance level-operational, intermediate or depot
the failed component should be repaired, or if instead of being repaired,
whether it should be discarded. In turn, these decisions will effect the number
and skills of maintenance personnel, the quantity and disposition of spares
and support equipment, and the technical data required.
The impact of these factors on cost should not be understated. It was
Milton Freedman that said there is no such thing as a free lunch in
economics, and the same can be said of life cycle cost. Both reliability and
maintainability are characteristics of the design. While designing for these
characteristics may cost very little, it might also cost a great deal. The
methodology of life cycle cost is concerned with the trade-off of the impact of
designing for increased reliability and maintainability on operating and
support costs, against any additional R&D and production cost that might be
incurred. There comes a point when the marginal cost of improved reliability
and maintainability exceeds the marginal benefit in reduced operating and
support costs. This is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 for the ARC-164 aircraft
communication system. In Figure 2 the projected reliability of the equipment
is plotted against the increasing estimated acquisition cost to obtain it, and
separately against the reduced estimates for operating and support costs it will
yield. The two resulting curves are summed to obtain the life cycle cost curve.
It can be seen that a point is reached at around a Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) of 1000 hours where the life cycle costs begin to rise.
The thrust of efforts to minimize life cycle cost is therefore directed at
finding the appropriate balance of minimal maintenance cost and acquisition
cost. But, reduced maintenance cost means not only improving the MTBF, it
13
requires at the same time making the equipment less expensive to fix when it
fails. Modularization, built in test equipment, provision of test points, and
ease of access, are all design characteristics of maintainability which impact on
the cost of repair.
30
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Figure 2. Relationship of Procurement Costs, Life Cycle (10 year) Maintenance
Costs, and Life Cycle Cost to Equipment MTBF for the ARC-164 [Ref. 8:p. 151
Another of the cost drivers is the supportability of the equipment.
Supportability is the degree to which the system can be supported both in
terms of its inherent characteristics of design and the effectiveness of the
overall support capability of the client military services. [Ref. 2:p. 16] Major
considerations in supportability include commonality of parts with those
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already in the inventory, the capability of the system to be tested without
extensive special purpose test equipment, nor the need to establish special
facilities for its repair. Systems that are able to utilize much of the existing
infrastructure result in considerably reduced initial acquisition logistics costs,








cost is the sum of the
initial acquisition cost
and recurring logistic cost
500 Hr 1000 Hr 2000 Hr
MTBF
Figure 3. Life Cycle Cost Versus MTBF for the ARC-164 [Ref. 9:p. 32]
Therefore, as a decision making tool, life cycle cost is concerned with
the trade-offs of the effects of the cost drivers. Many of the cost drivers are a
reflection on the design of the equipment. These are critical relationships and
should be understood and identified early in the decision making process.
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B. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND CONSTRAINTS.
1. Evaluation Criteria
Decisions concerning the life cycle cost of a system do not occur in
isolation. They must be balanced against issues of effectiveness. Effectiveness
is "a measure of the extent to which a system may be expected to achieve a set
of specified mission requirements, and is a function of availability,
dependability and capability." [Ref. 10] Thus, life cycle cost analysis is really
one aspect of a more general cost effectiveness analysis. This relationship
between life cycle cost and system effectiveness is represented
diagrammatically at Figure 4. The criteria for effectiveness are factors such as
physical system parameters like size, weight or capacity; and performance
parameters such as range, probability of kill, and availability. There are many
ways to tradeoff effectiveness. Two examples will be given.
Cost Effectiveness
Life Cycle Cost System EffectivenessI T-
" R&D cost o System characteristics:
" Production & Construction cost size, weight, capacity
" Operation & Support cost * System performance:
" Reitrement & Disposal cost prob. of kill, Availability,
range, etc.
Figure 4. Cost Effectiveness [Ref. 11:p. 12]
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Firstly, using the availability of a system as a measure of effectiveness.
Availability is defined as a measure of system readiness that "determines the
degree, percent, or probability that a system will be ready or available when
required for use." [Ref. 2:p. 64] There are three different measures of
availability: inherent, achieved, and operational. Operational availability is
the most widely used and will be discussed here. Mathematically operational
availability (Ao) is expressed as:
MTBM
Ao- =MTBM + MDT
where MTBM, the mean time between maintenance, includes the time
between both preventative and corrective maintenance; and MDT, the mean
down time, includes the time to perform the maintenance and any logistics
or administrative delay time. The operational availability of a system is
effected by its reliability, maintainability, and supportability. As can be seen by
examining the mathematical representation of Ao, if the MTBM can be
increased, by say making the system more reliable, (that is, increasing its
MTBF) the operational availability will also be increased. Similarly, if the
system can be repaired quickly because it has built-in test equipment, modular
components to facilitate removal, and uses standard components so that
there is a greater probability of a spare being in stock when required, then the
MDT will decrease, and the operational availability increase.
A second example of effectiveness tradeoffs might be the probability
of mission completion. The effects of reliability (MTBF) on this measure of
effectiveness will be illustrated. If to complete its mission a system is required
to be operational for 400 hours, and it has an MTBF of 250 hours, there is only
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a 20 percent chance of mission completion. (Probability of mission
completion = e-nict where n = number of units, xr = failure rate, and t = time.)
If the MTBF can be increased to 750 hours, the probability of mission
completion still only increases to 58 percent. The MTBF has to be increased to
around 4000 hours before the probability of mission completion exceeds even
90 percent. However, if instead of one system there are two, and it is only
necessary for one of the systems to be operational to complete the mission, if
the MTBF is 250 hours there is a 36 percent chance of mission completion. If
the MTBF is increased to 750 hours there is a 82 percent chance, and if it is
increased to 4000 hours there is a 99 percent chance of mission completion.
This logic applies whether the question is to build in redundancy, that is
parallel systems, or to determine an op,imal number of units in a fleet in
order to complete a mission. A similar effect can be shown if instead of
increasing the MTBF the number of hour of service required from the
system (t) is reduced in increments.
In conducting effectiveness tradeoffs the question needs to be asked
whether the increases in effectiveness are justified in relation to their cost
impact. In many instances, such as in the examples above, measures of
effectiveness can be increased by impacting the operation and support cost
drivers, such that there is a resultant increase in effectiveness and decrease in
operating and support costs. But this might not always be so, and may be
outweighed by increased acquisition cost. In the case above, where adding
another system of the same reliability increased effectiveness, it would likely
increase acquisition cost, and may also increase operation and support costs
because of the requirement to operate and maintain twice as many systems.
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The difficulty in determining cost effectiveness is to meaningfully
compare the value of different levels of effectiveness. In the illustration at
Figure 5 for example, in Case 1, choice A is clearly preferable to choice B
because it has both lower life cycle cost and higher effectiveness. However, in
Case 2, A is only preferable to B if the value or worth of the increase in cost is
offset by the increase in effectiveness.





Effectiveness Effecti ve ness
Figure 5. Life Cycle Cost Versus Effectiveness Tradeoffs [Ref.12:p. 2-61
Since the purpose of life cycle cost analysis is rarely to determine the
life cycle cost per se, but to compare and trade it off against some other criteria,
these criteria need to be defined in the analysis process, and there needs to be
some understanding of the relative weight of effectiveness and cost.
2. Constraints
All decision making is subject to certain constraints. These may be
imposed by the design of the equipment, operational constraints on
minimum performance criteria that the system must meet, or constraints as
simple as the time frame in which the analysis must occur. All constraints
serve to limit the analysis and restrict the options of the decision maker. For
example, it may be a requirement that a system be overhauled in the field by
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operational personnel regardless of whether it is the most cost effective
maintenance policy. Similarly, for operational reasons, a minimum reliability
threshold of 2000 hours MTBF may be imposed on a system even though to
do so results in a higher life cycle cost than if a lower MTBF had been
specified. If design to cost goals and thresholds are imposed on a program
these will be constraints to which the analysis should be oriented.
A further set of constraints, not usually considered, are the implicit
characteristics of the user's internal environment. These are factors such as
the skill levels and rank structure of operators and maintainers, the
administrative lead time to process demands for spares and push defective
items through the repair pipeline, the inventory holding cost for spares,
basing policy, and the overhead of administrative activities. In an
illuminating article I Dreamed We Went Nowhere in Our Solid Gold
Airplane, the President of Boeing Aerospace, O.C. Boileau [Ref. 13], identified
this operating and support cost overhead as the largest single encumbrance to
realizing significant life cycle cost savings in defense. These implicit
constraints are factors which the decision maker inherits, and over which in
the short term he has little control. Constraints are a limiting factor in the
analysis, and along with the evaluation criteria need to be identified in the
analysis process.
C. DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR ANALYSIS
1. Data Requirements and Availability.
Data is probably the single most important and most difficult part of
the analysis process. Life cycle cost analysis is based on the assumption that
past experience is an accurate guide to the future. Therefore, in order to
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predict the future, something needs to be known of the past. Three types of
historical data are required for cost analysis:
* Resource data. Which includes such things as the time to manufacture
or repair an item, the skill levels and costs of the personnel involved,
and the material used in the manufacture or repair.
* Physical and Performance Characteristics. These include not only factors
like weight, range and power, but MTBF, mean time to repair (MTTR),
and measures of the support environment.
* Program Data. Which includes the delivery schedule, planned
utilization, basing and deployment, and the maintenance concept.
[Ref. 141
The availability and accuracy of data is likely to be a major limiting
factor in the analysis. The data required will depend on the accuracy and
detail of the decision at hand, and the cost estimating technique to be used.
Usually the engineering type of data should be fairly readily available even if
only as estimates in the initial analysis, but ironically resource and physical
and performance data concerning the users own environment is likely to be
the most suspect. This is partly because cost data needs to reflect not only
direct costs, but a sound allocation of all indirect costs. There is great difficulty
in this allocation, and it is one of the major stumbling blocks to the credibility
of the analysis. One method to obtaining this data is input-output analysis.
2. Input-Output Analysis: The Navy Resource Model (NARM)
Input-output analysis is a technique used for determining indirect
costs associated with a decision. Where this is particularly useful is in
determining the indirect costs associated with operation and support that may
not otherwise be visible or difficult to allocate. For example, if a new system
requires additional training of operators and maintainers, the workload on
the training establishments will be increased, which in turn, will mean the
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training establishment will demand more from the other support resources.
[Ref. 15:p. 5] To model this situation and capture indirect cost using input-
output analysis, the U.S. Navy developed the Navy Resource Model
(NARM).
Input-output analysis examines the interrelations between
components of a system by accounting for the flow of resources. It does this by
firstly dividing the system up into sectors, and then the sectors into two
groups: those that produce goods and services, which are support sectors, and
those that only consume output, which are called final users. [Ref. 16:p. 4] In
the NARM the sectors represent organizations or functions such as Anti-
Submarine Warfare and Recruit Training. [Ref. 15:p. 51 Since the output of
one sector becomes an input to another, the problem becomes one of
modeling the changes in the level of activity of the final users with changes
in the workload and resources consumed by the support sectors.
Rather than attempt to measure the actual output provided to users
by the support sections, input-output analysis uses proxies for real output.
These proxy variables are characteristics of the system that are assumed to
vary roughly in proportion to the real measure. In the NARM, for simplicity,
the proxies are either operating costs or manpower.[Ref. 15:p. 51 To organize
the data, it is assembled into a transaction matrix where each row represents
the output of that sector, and shows how this is ailocated to each of the
consuming sectors. The basic format for the transaction matrix is illustrated
in Table 1, and a numeric example in Table 2.
Table 2 illustrates that, in this particular example, to support the
command sections output of 8557 units, it requires 456 units of operation and
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maintenance (O&M) and 328 units of manpower. If this were a life cycle cost
analysis, where the impact of two alternatives were being examined, the
changes caused by each alternative could be assessed and quantified for
addition in the analysis.
TABLE 1. INPUT-OUTPUT TRANSACTION MATRIX [ Ref. 17]
SUPPORT END USER TOTAL
SUPPORT Support Support Total
of of Support
Support End User
RESOURCES Resources Resources Total
for for Resources
Support End user
TABLE 2. TRANSACTION MATRIX NUMERIC EXAMPLE [Ref. 15:p. 5]
Command Training TacAir ASW TOTAL
Command 815 1542 2920 3280 8557
Training 328 864 406 665 2263
O&M$ 456 259 286 367
Manpower 328 864 406 665
Use of the NARM is not as widespread as it used to be, although it is
still in occasional use. It was for example, used for the SSN-21 operating and
support cost estimates discussed as a case in the appendix. The problem with
it is that its proxy variables are crude, and do not necessarily reflect the true
propotion of the relationship between components of the system. Input-
output analysis none-the-less remains a valid approach to the difficult task of
determining the indirect costs associated with decision alternatives.
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3. Data Issues in Life Cycle Cost Analysis
For the purpose of life cycle cost analysis however, it is by no means
agreed how important it is to have data that accurately reflects all costs. There
are two views to this issue. On the one hand it is argued that life cycle cost is
not conducted for the purpose of finding out the life cycle cost per se; it is
done as a means of comparison and tradeoff with the life cycle cost of other
systems, and for evaluation against other criteria. In this case what is
important is that the same costs are applied to each system, and that the costs
are reasonable, if not accurate. In such comparisons there will be costs
between systems that are common and can be ignored. This, for example, is
the reasoning of Life Support Cost models (to be discussed latter in this
chapter) for considering only the direct support costs of alternatives. Central
to this view is that even if costs were known and accurate, there are so many
other sources of uncertainty in the analysis that emphasis should be on
visibility and simplicity. Taken to its logical conclusion, this view argues that,
early in the life cycle when life cycle cost analysis is mostly applied, there is
little real data on the system under examination. Because the data used is
historical from another system, which may bear only some resemblance to
the system being analysed, capturing the right data is of little consequence
[Ref. 181.
On the other hand, if real and accurate costs are not known the real
relatives between alternatives will not be known, and this may inhibit the
decision. The consequences of not knowing the real relatives between
alternatives will be discussed latter in this chapter in the context of risk and
uncertainty. Additionally, for affordability decisions one of the criteria against
24
which a proposal will be judged is anticipated future budgets. If accurate data
is not available this sort of decision can not occur. A further problem with a
lack of accuracy is that it reduces the credibility of the analysis undertaken.
There is no totally correct answer to this debate. Ideally, accurate
historical data would be available with which to conduct the analysis. While
historical costs of other systems may not exactly reflect the future costs of the
system under examination, it is the only means to estimate these costs, and a
better estimate will be obtained with accurate historical data than without.
However, there are many instances when the decision to be made does not
require analysis of all the life cycle costs. Such a decision might, for example,
be when conducting level of repair analysis or even some design tradeoffs,
when only a certain aspects of a system's cost need be examined over the life
cycle. Still however, if the data that is needed is accurate, better decisions are
likely to result.
D. OTHER COST ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS
1. Cost Breakdown Structure
In order to identify all the elements of relevant cost for life cycle cost
analysis in a consistent and logical manner, a cost breakdown structure (also
known as a cost element structure) is developed. The cost breakdown
structure is a hierarchical division of cost by function and major element. It is
very similar to a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), and is usually based on
this. The lowest hierarchical level to which the cost breakdown structure will
descend will depend on the estimating technique to be used and the nature of
the decision for which the analysis is being conducted.
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2. Baseline Systems
A common and valuable technique in cost analysis is baselining. This
involves comparing the known costs and cost drivers of a baseline system
with those of the system subject to analysis. The baseline system is both a
reference point for the cost analyst and for the decision maker to help identify
relevant costs and cost drivers, to act as a check of the analysis, and to aid in
focusing in on problems of the past which a new design may alleviate.
Needless to say, the baseline system should be as close to possible in its
physical and performance characteristics with the system under analysis. In
acquisition decisions the reference system is usually the old capability which
it is proposed to replace.
3. Accounting For Inflation, and The Time Value of Money.
Because of the modern ravages of inflation, any analysis that uses cost
as a unit of measurement must ensure that it is expressed in a consistent
common year basis. Inflationary indices should be applied to all historical cost
data to ensure that they have a common base year.
When considering costs to be incured in the future, consideration
should also be made of the time value of money. That is, that money
invested in the near term has more value than money invested in the distant
future. This is because there is an opportunity cost of money. If money is
invested now, its use for other productive purposes is precluded. To account
for the time value of money the technique of discounting future cash flows is
used. Its effect is to make alternatives that require spending sooner less
attractive than those that defer spending to some future date. This is
illustrated in Figure 6, where on the basis of undiscounted life cycle cost the
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SYSTEM A Totals
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
YeWToW 70000 250000 300450 521349 622698 258497 269396 269396 211027 134698 2907511
Discount Fact 0.870 0.756 0.658 0.572 0.497 0.432 0.376 0327 0284 0.247
N.P.V 60900 189000 197696 298212 309481 111671 101293 88093 59932 33270 1 1449548
SYSTEM B Totals
YEAR 1 2 38 4 10
Year TOW 87000 286000 337944 548831 637662 214437 215324 215324 168671 107662 2818855
Discount Fact 0.870 0.756 0.658 0.572 0.497 0.432 0.376 0.327 0284 0247
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Figure 6. Discounting
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decision maker would prefer system B-$2,818,855, as compared to $2,907,511
for system A. However, when a 15 percent discount factor is used, system A
has the lower life cycle cost-$1,449,548 as compared to $1,463,628 for system
B.
In some respects the application of discounting can be counter to the
philosophy of life cycle cost. That is, life cycle cost encourages a program
manager to spend additional funds on R&D and production in order to save
future money on operation and support. Discounting diminishes the effect of
this. [Ref. 19:p. 801
There is difficulty in determining an appropriate discount factor. For
business, selection of the discount factor is usually guided by the return they
could safely get investing their money elsewhere. However, what is an
appropriate dscount factor for the government? Long argues that even
though the government is not guided by profit, the government also has
other things it could use its money for, not the least of which is to pay off its
debt to avoid future interest. An appropriate discount factor for the
government is, therefore, the interest rate on its loans. [Ref. 19:p. 811 Current
practice in the U.S. Department of Defense is to use a default of 10 percent
regardless of the economic climate.
The cost analysis requirements discussed in this section are broad
indicators to some of the factors that are an adjunct to life cycle cost analysis.
The cost breakdown structure, baseline systems, discounting and the
application of inflationary indicies are tools to the analysis process, and factors
that need to be considered and resolved before commencing the quantative
analysis.
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E. SELECTION OF A COST ESTIMATING TECHNIQUE
In An Introduction to Cost Estimating, Batchelder etal. lefine a cost
estimate as "a judgement of opinion regarding the cost of an object,
commodity or service... [that] may be arrived at formally or informally by a
variety of methods." [Ref. 14:p. 1] There are generally considered to be three
methods to cost estimating: the analogy, cost estimating relationship, and
engineering techniques. To develop cost estimates any one or combination of
the techniques are used.
1. Analogy
The analogy method is a comparison with the attributes and costs of
similar systems and programs to estimate the cost of the system being
analyzed. The comparison can either be direct or scaled to account for
differences between the programs. Mathematically the relationship between
the estimate and the baseline system is represented as y = X x, where X = 1 if
the comparison is direct, or other than 1 if a scaling factor is applied. An
example of the analogy estimate, in its simplest form, is that if it cost X dollars
to procure a particular equipment, and it costs Z dollars to operate and
support it each year, then the life cycle cost of a similar system over a 10 year
life cycle will be Y = X + 1OZ. If using scaling, it may be determined that
because the new equipment has twice as many critical components as its
existing counterpart, a scaling factor of 2 should be applied. Therefore, the life
cycle cost will be Y = 2(X + 1OZ).
2. Cost Estimating Relationships (CER)
The cost estimating relationships method is a statistical technique,
also known as parametric estimating, which develops, using regression
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analysis, a generalized relationship between system characteristics and cost.
Like analogy, it uses historical data from similar systems. But unlike the
analogy method, it applies statistical analysis to fit a line between data points,
called explanatory variables, in an attempt to find a relationship between
them and cost. The explanatory variables may be input parameters such as
physical characteristics, or output parameters such as performance or other
measures of effectiveness. The technique can be applied at a very macro level,
or to individual cost elements at a lower level of the cost breakdown
hierarchy and aggregated. Mathematically this relationship is represented as
y = X f(x). The relationship may be linear in the form of y = a + bx, or non
linear such as exponential in the form y = abx.
3. Engineering Estimate
The engineering approach, also called bottom up estimating, is an
examination of the costs, and characteristics that influence costs, at the lowest
level. The engineering approach separates out segments of work into labor,
material costs, tooling, documentation, fuel, repair parts etc., which are then
summed to progressively higher levels until a total cost estimate is obtained.
Mathematically this is represented as y = X(pi.qi), where p is the cost, and q is
the quantity. For example, to estimate the maintenance manpower cost
component of operation and support costs, the starting point would be the
frequency of failures, and the frequency of preventative maintenance. To
these would be applied the mean time to repair, to obtain the mean
maintenance man-hours for the operating cycle. This would then be applied
to the costs for personnel at the various skill levels involved to obtain the
maintenance manpower costs. This estimate would be added to estimates
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obtained in similar ways for the other components of cost to obtain the total
operating and support costs of a system. The engineering approach can be
used to estimate all aspects of life cycle cost.
4. Advantages and Disadvantages to the Estimating Techniques
The estimating techniques are not mutually exclusive, and may be
combined in the analysis. However, each of the methods have advantages
and significant disadvantages to their use. The analogy method has the
advantage that it is by far the least complex and time consuming approach.
Since very few systems are totally new, the value of analogy is that it can be
easily applied to components of the system for which there is some
experience and actual data. However, if significant scaling is required the
credibility of the method decreases markedly, since it relies heavily on the
opinion of the analyst as to what the scaling factor should be.
The cost estimating relationship approach has the advantage that it
can be applied to varying levels of the cost breakdown structure as the detail
of the decision requires, and availability of the data dictates. This approach is
most useful for estimating the production and construction components of
life cycle cost, where it has been used with some success. For operating and
support costs the value of its application is at a more macro level. At a
detailed level of analysis the parametric method is not well suited to
distinguishing between design differences that influence operating and
support costs. A further criticism is that, by its nature, a cost estimating
relationship tells a great deal about the factors that lead to the construction of
the estimate, but it may bear little relationship to the factors driving cost in
the system being analyzed. Related to this is the problem that it assumes that
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the costs of operating and support of comparable systems are related in some
way to the costs of supporting the system being analyzed. These are problems
caused by the practicalities of trying to estimate cost on the basis of historical
data for similar systems. As pointed out by Sovereign:
In producing CERs and then treating them as statistical forecasts, we are
violating the fundamental principle of statistics, which is that our data
must be samples from a definable, single population .... The reason we
design new systems is that they are different, otherwise we would buy
more of the old ones. [Ref. 20:p. 37]
The engineering approach is potentially the most useful of the cost
estimating techniques if all relevant costs are considered. On occasions
however, the engineering approach may not be reliable because the estimator
will only include costs they are aware of [Ref. 14:p. 5]. Whilst this criticism can
be leveled at all the methods, because of their application at a more macro
level, the parametric and analogy methods tend to sweep up costs that may be
missed in an engineering estimate. For example, in estimating the costs of
construction, the costs of rework, planning time and quality control are
uncertain and easy to underestimate [Ref. 14:p. 5]. In estimating operating and
support costs, the costs of repairing failures during burn in, or due to operator
and maintainer error are difficult to predict. These are only a problem if the
decision warrants that level of accuracy. The major disadvantage of the
engineering method is that it is extremely time consuming and requires a
great deal of data. That said, it is the most useful way to analyze design
tradeoffs, differentiate between the life cycle costs of alternate designs, and
conduct level of repair and other logistics support analyses and tradeoffs.
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5. Timing in the Application of Different Estimating Techniques
The different advantages and disadvantages of the cost estimating
techniques lend the techniques to application during different times in a
system's life cycle. During Concept Exploration where alternative approaches
to satisfying a mission need are being explored for affordability, analogy or
gross parametric techniques are appropriate. As the concept is defined, and a
broad design determined, parametric methods to a lower level of detail, and
analogy with appropriate scaling can be used. As the design becomes firm, or
alternate off the shelf designs are being evaluated, engineering methods can
be brought in to the analysis. To reiterate, the different methods of estimating
are not mutually exclusive and a combination of techniques can be used as
appropriate.
F. LIFE CYCLE COST MODELS
A cost model is nothing more than a representation of the real world that
can be applied to a specific situation to obtain a cost estimate. A cost model
may use any or all of the estimating techniques discussed above to attempt to
predict the real world costs of a system. The estimate may be manually
generated or, as is increasingly the case, be generated using a software model
that is run on a computer.
Life cycle cost models proliferate. In the mid 1970's it was estimated that
there were over 1000 models [Ref.21]. As was observed at the same time by a
U.S. Air Force working group examining life cycle cost models:
...every system, subsystem, component has certain unique characteristics
performance [ .ic] that influences its development, acquisition and
operating and support costs. Because these characteristics vary, and
because of the different design issues that occur throughout the life cycle
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of a system, subsystem, component, new life cycle cost models are being
developed at a rapid rate. [Ref. 221
The passage of time has seen this prediction materialize. Today one
observer noted, the number of life cycle cost models is probably closer to 3000
[Ref. 4]. Many of these models however, are specific purpose models with
only limited application now that they have served their purpose.
Life cycle cost models can be considered to fall under one of four general
categories. (The Air Force's life cycle cost working group defined ten
categories of life cycle cost models, there is however repetition in their
categories.) The four categories are:
" Accounting Models. In accounting models costs are categorized,
aggregated to a total, and displayed as a spread of expenditures. All life
cycle cost models are accounting models to the extent that they all, to
some degree, aggregate and categorize costs. What differentiates
accounting models is that this is all they do.
" Cost Estimating Relationship Models. In cost estimating relationship
models the parametric techniques of statistical regression discussed
above, are used to relate aspects of life cycle cost directly to parameters of
design, performance or the logistics environment. Cost estimating
relationship models include what are called factor models which apply a
derived factor to key system parameters to arrive at costs.
" Analytical models. Analytical models use mathematical equations to
describe the relationship of one variable to another. What differentiates
analytical models from cost etimating relationship models is that the
equations are not statistically derived. Analytical models for the most
part employ the techniques of engineering estimating described in the
previous section. Special purpose analytical models include: level of
repair analysis models, which determine the most cost effective
maintenance policy; inventory models, which show the effects of
inventory on cost; logistic support cost and life support cost models,
which show the effect of design on logistics cost; and manpower models,
which specifically relate design parameters to their effect on manpower
and manpower cost.
* Simulation Models. In simulation a model is developed that represents
the particular problem, and then experiments are performed on the
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model by altering the controllable variables to determine the impact on
cost. [Ref. 23:p. 596] What differentiates simulation models, is that the
experiments are performed by conducting many trials, using random
numbers generating from a probability distribution that represent the
range of probable values, and observing their effect. Simulation models
are used to determine the impact of basing, maintenance planning, and
spares and support policies on logistics costs.
The majority of life cycle cost models are either cost estimating
relationship models or analytical models. Some of the better known cost
estimating relationship models include those developed by the RAND
corporation for aircraft airframe, avionics and missile production costs; and
the RCA Price series of models. Because the regression equations in cost
estimating relationship models require constant update to reflect new data
points, and are usually very system specific, most models are developed in
house, on an as required basis by the user. Often older models are calibrated
to reflect new data when needed. Examples of modeling with cost estimating
equations is provided in the appendix.
The breadth of analytical models and their uses is extensive and reflects
the diversity of use of life cycle cost analysis. Most models tend to concentrate
on a specific task. A common approach to this in many analytical models is
to narrow the costs under consideration to concentrate purely on logistic
costs. These are variously known as life support cost models or logistic
support cost models.
A consequence of the specificity of models is that, as a RAND study of life
cycle cost models in the late 1970's found:
None of the models discussed here-nor any others that we know of-
provides full coverage of the life cycle cost estimates or the major
driving costs, which means that comprehensive cost estimates require a
hybrid combination of generalized models or a combination of models
and ad hoc methods. [Ref. 24]
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Many of the models which the RAND and Air Force studies reviewed
are still in use, although updated and often modified where necessary, to
now run on personal computers. As one long time observer of life cycle cost
noted "nothing much has changed" [Ref. 21]. Discussions which the author
had with practitioners of life cycle cost analysis in the U.S. indicated that the
conclusion of the RAND study still largely holds true for the life cycle cost
models used in all the U.S. services today. However, with the widespread use
of personal computers there have been some more recent efforts at
producing more comprehensive life cycle cost models. Two examples are
CASA, the Cost Analysis Strategy Assessment Model of the Defense Systems
Management College, and a commercial product, EDCAS produced by a
company called Systems Exchange. There is also an effort currently in
progress in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Logistics Policy
and Appraisals area to develop a new comprehensive analytical Navy life
cycle cost model [Ref. 25].
The selection of a model or models will largely depend on what the
purpose of the analysis is, and at what stage in the life cycle the analysis is
conducted. The timing in the application of a particular model is dependant
on the estimating techniques used, and the same considerations apply as in
selecting the appropriate technique. As a broad guide on the use of models,
models based around parametric costing techniques are usually used for
affordability decisions conducted early in the life cycle, and are for the most
part developed for the specific analysis. In selecting amongst alternative
designs either in the design process or for source selection, and for conducting
logistics analysis, analytical models based on engineering data are appropriate,
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although a hybrid cost estimating and analytical model might also be used
depending on the particular problem to be solved. Simulation models are
usually most applicable in conducting logistic analysis. While it makes sense
to use an existing model if one is available to solve the problem, caution
should be exercised to ensure that the model fits the problem rather than
making the problem fit the available model.
G. SENSITIVITY AND UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS
Sensitivity, and uncertainty analysis are valuable techniques to apply
once a model has been developed and run. Sensitivity analysis examines the
impact of changes in input parameters on the result produced by the model.
Varying the input parameters over a range to see the impact on cost can help
highlight the major factors effecting cost, and show the effects of tradeoffs on
cost.
There is considerable uncertainty in cost estimates. Uncertainty analysis is
an attempt to come to terms with the possible ranges of the estimate and their
effect on decisions. Although often used synonymously risk and uncertainty
are technically different. Risk implies that an outcome is a random event
stemming from a known probability distribution whereas uncertainty, while
probabalistic in nature, is characterized by an unknown probability
distribution [Ref. 26:p. 17]. In practical terms, risk reflects statistical errors in
estimating, while uncertainty is due to an inability to measure cost or other
parameters precisely, and to the unknown changes in requirements, policy,
design and schedule that invariably occur. There are techniques for dealing
with risk, and these will not be entered into here. Two excellent sources for
reference are Long, J. A., Life Cycle Costing in a Dynamic Envioronment,
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[Ref. 191 and a supplement to Batchelder, C.A. etal. An Introduction to
Equipment Cost Estimating. [Ref. 141
Life cycle cost estimating is a normative approach [Ref. 27] That is, its
input parameters and output cost are those that should occur, not those that
will actually occur. It makes assumptions about these input parameters,
system characteristics, and support and deployment policies, which if changed
may have significant effect on the estimate. These elements of uncertainty
can be partially dealt with by using sensitivity analysis to produce a range of
costs that reflect the range of likely outcomes. This is particularly important
when using life cycle cost to distinguish between alternatives, as an incorrect
decision may occur with out these considerations. This is illustrated in
Figure 7.
In Figure 7 the diagrams represent the probability distributions for a range
of costs that reflect the uncertainty in the cost estimates. Case 1 in Figure 7
represents the ideal where the range of estimates between alternatives is
distinct. Without consideration of range, a point estimate would still lead to
selection of system A on the basis of lowest cost. In case 2, while a point
estimate would indicate the cost of A is still less than B, there is some
probability that the actual cost of A will be greater than B. This is the overlap.
If the overlap is large a point estimate could give the wrong decision. In case
3, the expected cost of B is only slightly lower than A, and therefore would be
selected on the basis of a point estimate. But given the range of B compared to
A, it is much less certain that B will actually be less than A, so consideration
of the point estimate alone, without any concern for the confidence of this
estimate, may lead to a wrong decision.
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Figure 9. Uncertainty [Ref. 19:p. 42-43]
Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis will, therefore, indicate to the
decision maker the confidence that should be placed in the estimate, and the
effect of altering critical parameters and assumptions on the result. In this,
they augment the central analysis. The value of these exercises in the analysis
process is to promote a better understanding of the factors effecting cost, and
the limitations of the analysis. To be aware of these will likely result in better
decisions from the estimate.
H. CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed some of the the key points and issues of life
cycle cost as a decision making tool. It has done so in the context of a general
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life cycle cost analysis approach both to illustrate the process and to provide a
framework for the discussion. The relevance of the points brought out in this
chapter will be enlarged upon in the following chapter where the current
state of life cycle costing in the U.S. Department of Defense will be examined.
This chapter can be thought of as the theory, and the following chapter the
practice of life cycle cost. This chapter has examined some of the techniques
and vocabulary necessary to understand the practice of life cycle cost analysis.
The major points of this chapter are that life cycle cost has several uses as
a decision making tool: to evaluate affordability; to assess competing designs
for least life cycle cost and to influence designs in this direction; and to
conduct design and logistic support tradeoffs. However, these decisions are
just different points along the same continuum, and an analysis started for
affordability decisions should, as data becomes available and other estimating
techniques become appropriate, be reviewed and revised until ultimately it is
also used for making decisions about the logistic support environment.
Life cycle cost concerns the tradeoffs of reliability, maintainability, and
supportability-the operating and support cost drivers, with any increases in
R&D and production costs that may result. Life cycle cost analysis should
therefore, be thought of in the larger sense as cost effectiveness analysis.
The issue of data has been discussed. Three tupes of data are needed for
life cycle cost analysis: resource data, physical and performance characteristics,
and program data. Of these resource data is likely to be the most difficult to
obtain, particularly data on indirect costs. The input-output analysis approach
has been examined as one means for obtaining this type of data. Also
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discussed have been the arguments on how important accurate data is for the
purpose of life cycle cost analysis.
Already in this discussion of the theory of life cycle cost analysis, several
problems and criticisms have been identified that are likely to have
consequence to its practice. These include the limitations of the techniques,
the proliferation of cost models, and the treatment of uncertainty. Practically
how these effect life cycle cost analysis will be examined in the following
chapter.
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III. LIFE CYCLE COSTING IN THE U.S.
This chapter will explore where and for what purpose life cycle cost
analysis is incorporated in the U.S. Department of Defense, and who the
major players are in the process. The process described will be for major
weapon systems programs, also known as Acquisition Category One (ACAT I)
programs. Less than major system programs follow a similar, if less closely
regulated process. Additionally, this chapter will describe the major data
source for life cycle cost analysis in the U.S.-the VAMOSC system. The focus
of this chapter will be predominantly with the U.S. Navy to illustrate the
process and organization of life cycle costing. The appendix to this study
complements this chapter. In the appendix two examples of the U.S. Navy's
application of life cycle costing are discussed-the SSN 21 SEAWOLF
Submarine Program, and the F/A 18 HORNET Fighter Aircraft Program.
A. THE FRAMEWORK FOR LIFE CYCLE COST IN THE U.S.
The framework for life cycle cost analysis in the U.S. are the various
regulations that govern the weapons system acquisition process and its
related activities, and the organizations that implement them. An
examination of the regulations should define how life cycle cost is viewed
officially, and how it should be used. However, the regulations will not
necessarily indicate whether in practice life cycle cost is accorded the same
attention. This section will review the regulations concerning the acquisition
process, design to cost, source selection, and integrated logistic support to
discern the official U.S. position on life cycle cost. Additionally, the functional
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organizations responsible for life cycle cost will be discussed. Some
conclusions and observations about the regulations and the organizations
will be included in an overview discussion.
1. Life Cyde Cost in The Acquisition Process
The policy basis for weapons system acquisition process is Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109 which details policy for major
acquisitions in all U.S. federal agencies. The Department of Defense (DOD)
interpretation of this policy is DOD Directive (DODD) 5000.1, which in turn is
implemented by DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, Defense Acquisition
Program Procedures. Each of the military services also have their own
regulations which compliment DOD and Federal policy guidelines.
The acquisition process described by the above regulations segregates
acquisition in to five milestones and phase, These phases correspond to the
phases of an equipment's life cycle. The acquisition process is briefly
illustrated at Figure 8. At each milestone major programs are reviewed by a
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The DAB is the senior DOD acquisition
review board and is chaired by the Under Secretary for Defense for
Acquisition, also known as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). The
Secretary for the DAB is the Vice Joint Chief of Staff, and each of the services
are represented on the board. There are also ten DAB Committees that report
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Life cycle cost is given considerable emphasis in the policy and
implementation guidance for the acquisition process. Circular A-109 directs
that a major system acquisition management objective will be to
Maintain a capability to: * Predict, review, assess, negotiate and monitor
costs for system development, engineering and design, demonstration,
test, production, operation and support (i.e., life cycle costs) * Assess
acquisition cost, schedule and performance experience against
predictions, and provide such assessments for consideration by the
agency head at key decision points * Make new assessments where
significant costs, schedule or performance variances occur 0 Estimate life
cycle costs during system design concept evaluation and selection, full-
scale development, facility conversion, and production, to ensure
appropriate trade-offs among investment costs, ownership costs,
schedules, and performance • Use independent cost estimates, where
feasible, for comparison purposes. [Ref. 28:p. 51
The importance of this objective is to lay the foundation for a policy
to procure effective, affordable and supportable systems to meet the mission
needs of the services.
The theme of affordability is continued in DODD 5000.1 [Ref. 29:p. 5-
61, which establishes checks and balances during DAB reviews to ensure that
it is reviewed at every milestone. In assessing affordability, DODD 5000.1
directs that: "a major defense acquisition program shall not be started unless
sufficient resources ... can be programmed to support projected development,
testing, production, fielding, and support requirements."
In addition to issues of affordability, DODD 5000.1 also introduces
sustainability and supportability as decision considerations. These it states,
should be a primary objective of the acquisition strategy, given early
consideration and the same emphasis as issues of performance and schedule.
Additionally, the directive also calls for "...funding to design-in reliability and
45
support characteristics ....,.. with the intention of reducing life cycle cost, early
in the program.
The practicalities of implementing this policy are dealt with in DODI
5000.2. [Ref. 30] Specifically, this instruction calls for life cycle cost to be
addressed in the Mission Need Statement for decision at Milestone 0, the
System Concept Paper for decision at Milestone I, and the Decision Co-
ordination Paper for Milestones II and beyond. These papers are documents
submitted by the program manager to the DAB for milestone review. The
annexes to both these papers also provides some insight. Annex C is a
Resource Cost Track Summary. This requires estimates for the cost at each of
the phases of the systems life cycle, and for an aggregated life cycle cost
estimate. Annex E is a Summary of Life-Cycle Cost Alternatives, which as its
name implies, is an assessment of the total costs of ownership of alternate
means of meeting the mission need that a program is intended to fill. Also of
consequence is Anne. B, which lists the cost, schedule, performance and
supportability goals of the program. It is worth noting that despite the
emphasis elsewhere, when it comes to defining goals and thresholds these are
not defined in terms of life cycle cost.
2. Life Cyde Cost in Design to Cost
DODD 4245.3 [Ref. 31] is the defense policy for design to cost. This
policy is implemented by the pamphlet Joint Design-To-Cost Guide: Life Cycle
Cost as a Design Parameter [Ref. 6] These documents establish life cycle cost as
the criteria for design to cost. As the latter of these documents states
Design to Cost Goals should be established for all elements of future Life
Cycle Cost which are design controllable. Acquisition strategies must
then be structured to achieve these goals. [Ref. 6:p. 4]
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What is important is that rather than just sailaway or flyaway cost
being the criteria for design to cost, life cycle cost is the constraint to which
affordable design should be oriented. This is further emphasized by the
requirement placed on the program manager in a design to cost program to:
...identify high-risk or high-cost components, which are the major life
cycle cost drivers that provide the greatest opportunity for design trade-
offs. During contract performance, containing cost driver costs shall be
emphasized. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
Design to Cost goals and thresholds are required by the regulations to
be firmly established during the Concept Demonstration and Validation
phases of the acquisition cycle, and measured during contract performance.
They also recommend that the contractual mechanisms of incentives and
awards be used to motivate the contractor to attain the required levels of
reliability and supportability.
3. Life Cycle Cost in Source Selection
Having established the requirement in the acquisition and design to
cost regulations to acquire affordable, supportable systems; it is perhaps
surprising that life cycle cost is given little attention or priority in the source
selection regulations for selecting amongst contractors during competitive
procurements. The directive on source selection, DODD 4105.62 [Ref. 32], only
defines cost to include "both unit production cost and life cycle cost" very late
in its discussion. Even then, this directive only talks in terms of cost, not life
cycle cost specifically.
It advises that although cost is always a criteria in source selection, it
is only important as a "discriminator in the source selection decision when
differences among proposals relative to other factors is small and when cost
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proposals have a high degree of realism and credibility."[Ref: 32:p. 5) Thus, if
any emphasis on life cycle cost can be construed from this regulation, its
importance in source selection is played down. While the absence of specific
concern for life cycle cost may be intended to give programs flexibility to tailor
selection criteria as appropriate to their particular program, it is perhaps
indicative of the real weight placed on life cycle cost in source selection.
4. Life Cycle Cost in Integrated Logistic Support
The regulation that governs Integrated Logistic Support (ILS), DODD
5000.39 [Ref. 7], discusses ILS in the context of the life cycle management of
major systems. While not specifically mentioning the term life cycle cost, it
does address such substitutes of life cycle cost as reliability, maintainability,
and supportability-issues effecting the operation and support cost
component of life cycle cost. Specifically, it directs that in the acquisition
process "starting with concept exploration," consideration should be given to
"system characteristics that best meet readiness and support cost objectives in
fielded systems." It further states that in considering support in the
acquisition process "support costs and readiness drivers" should be identified
as "targets for improvement," and issues of reliability, maintainability and
supportability should be assessed in system acquisitions and be the object of
design tradeoffs and contractor incentives. It is worth noting that in the Navy
instruction on ILS-SECNAVINST 5000.39A [Ref. 33], the use of life cycle cost
criteria for these design and support tradeoffs is specifically mandated.
In ILS the primary vehicle to achieve supportability considerations is
the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) conducted in accordance with MILSTD
1388. LSA can be ccnsidered as the application of analytical tools to evaluate
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alternate designs, support concepts and tradeoffs among ILS elements. In
essence there are a wide variety of analytical methods used in LSA, and life
cycle cost analysis is just one of these, although an important one.
5. The Major Organizations Involved in Life Cycle Cost Analysis
It is the Program Manager that has overall responsibility for getting a
program through the acquisition process. In Navy programs, the program
manager works within the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA), Naval Air
Systems (NAVAIR) or Naval Space and Electronic Systems (NAVSPAWAR)
commands. To assist in the preparation of cost estimates each program draws
upon the expertise of the cost shop within the systems command. These are
NAVSEA 017, NAVAIR 524, and NAVSPAWAR 10J. However, the expertise
of these areas is primarily for research and development cost, and for
production cost estimates. As a consequence, outside contractor resources are
commonly used for the preparation of operating and support cost estimates.
As part of the Navy's internal review and approval process, before
sending programs to the DAB, an independent estimate of a program's costs
is conducted by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis. If there is a significant
difference between the independent estimate and the program manager's
estimate this will usually be resolved before a program goes forward.
However, if the difference cannot be resolved two estimates will go forward.
This contrasts with the approach of the other services which reconcile any
differences and only put forward one estimate. [Ref. 34]
Prior to formal DAB review, cost estimates are reviewed by the Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). The CAIG is made up of various
members of the DAB and service appointees, and is staffed from the Office of
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the Secretary of Defense PA&E. The CAIG are the principle advisory body to
the DAB "on matters related to cost" [Ref. 35]. The CAIG Review is primarily
concerned with the completeness and quality of the estimates. Since only 3
weeks are given for a CAIG Review, it is by necessity at a more macro level
than that of either the program or the independent estimate. As a result of
their review of a program's estimates, the CAIG produce a CAIG Report' that
is submitted to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (the DAB
President). The approval process and the relationships between the different
areas responsible for cost analysis is illustrated in the diagram at Figure 9.
The CAIG as the ultimate arbiter of cost, sets the standards and
procedures for life cycle cost in all of DOD. They publish life cycle cost element
definitions and methodology guidance. In this role, their interest with life
cycle cost is primarily in the estimating methodoli gy and its assumptions.
Another functional area with interest in aspects of life cycle cost are
the services integrated logistics support communities. In the Navy, ILS is
ultimately the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for the Navy
Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN[S&L]), although there are also specific
responsibilities vested with some of the other assistant secretaries for some
aspects of ILS. [Ref. 33] The practicalities of conducting ILS however, are the
responsibilities of the various system commands. In NAVSEA it is the
Deputy Chief Engineer for logistics (CHENG-L) that is accountable for ILS and
setting NAVSEA logistics policy and practices. Under CHENG-L there are
various directorates that set specific logistics goals, and provide functional
support to program managers and their ILS managers in carrying out the ILS
for systems acquisitions.
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What is important in the Services logistics organization is not the
specific responsibilities of the individuals involved, but to realize that there
exists in this organization other groups who have their own particular
interests in life cycle cost as a means to prompt consideration of reliability,
maintainability and supportability in design, and as the basis for logistics
tradeoffs.
6. Overview of the Regulations and Organization for Life Cycle Cost
Analysis in the U.S.
Reviewing the regulations and organizations with an interest in life
cycle cost indicates DOD's prescribed approach to the use of life cycle cost
analysis. Life cycle cost is given specific attention in the regulations and
instructions that govern acquisition and design to cost, but less specific
attention in the regulations that cover integrated logistic support and source
selection. Thus while life cycle cost may not be accorded the regulatory
recognition for all its potential uses, it at least should be accorded a fair degree
of institutional emphasis. This appears, at least in theory, also to be backed up
by a costing and approval process that receives the input and oversight of a
number of different organizations with an interest in life cycle cost. This is
the regulatory and institutional framework in which life cycle cost analysis is
conducted in the U.S. It remains to be seen whether in practice life cycle cost is
really accorded any emphasis in decision making.
B. DISCUSSION OF THE PRACTICE OF LIFE CYCLE COSTING IN THE U.S.
The problem with analyzing life cycle cost in the U.S. is that there is not
consistency in its application, or its use in decision making. It would be easy
to say that life cycle cost is never a major consideration in decision making.
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However, as the example of the F/A-18 case in the appendix shows, there are
cases where a life cycle cost analysis approach have been applied with
considerable success. Similarly, although this is yet to be resolved, the V22
Program was not given favorable review by the CAIG, and at this stage,
approval to progress to production has been withheld largely on the basis of
the affordability of its operation and support costs [Ref. 371. However,' this
author's research indicates that in practice, cases such as these are more the
exception than they are the rule, and that in most if not all instances, very
little emphasis is really placed on life cycle cost as a basis for making decisions.
Rather than life cycle cost, the institutional emphasis is on acquisition
cost. Commonly, a reduction in operating and support costs is used by the
program office as one of a number of reasons to have a particular program
approved, but there is little indication that this is actually an overriding
consideration in program approval. And while most, but not all, programs
produce a life cycle cost estimate in order to meet the requirements of the
acquisition regulations, in the majority of cases, it is done in order to have the
boxed ticked on the way through the approval process.
In the review process, the Naval Center for Cost Analysis are primarily
concerned with the accuracy of the acquisition cost estimates. Unless they are
asked, or they perceive a particular problem with operating and support costs,
they only conduct a truly independent estimate of a program's acquisition
costs. This is not to say that the Naval Center for Cost Analysis do not review
the operating and support costs, but that they do so in considerably less detail
than with the acquisition costs. Similarly in there deliberations, the CAIG
while briefed on operating and support costs by the program office, are also
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more concerned with the acquisition cost of a program and its affordability
over the acquisition phases, than with costs to be incurred in operating and
support.
These findings are backed up by an earlier study conducted in 1979 that
surveyed over 300 people in the Congress, DOD and industry associated with
defense program management in the U.S. [Ref. 38]. Amongst the respondents,
the survey indicated that 75 percent considered unit production cost to be
more important than life cycle cost, and that in their decision making 88
percent said they directed their attention to near term acquisition cost rather
than long term operating and support costs. Of interest also is that a
significant majority of those surveyed believed that there was insufficient
guidance given on life cycle cost. This is despite the fact that all the relevant
regulations discussed and cited in this study had been promulgated at the
time. Only the regulation on Design to Cost, DODD 4245.3, was in a different
form as DODI 5000.28 at the time of the survey.
There are several reasons for the widespread lack of real concern for
determining life cycle cost. One is the orientation of the DOD. A significant
factor in the U.S.'s place as a military power is the technological
sophistication of its weapons systems. This has promoted a mindset that
places great importance on the acquisition of new and more capable weapons
systems. From this view point the emphasis is on getting shiny new
equipment that goes faster and shoots further. The costs of actual ownership
are secondary. McClendon [Ref. 4] argues that this is an endemic problem
which reflects a general lack of concern for the future not only in DOD but the
society as a whole. The budgetary process which places most interest and
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accountability for monies to be spent in the near term than the long term
promotes this view.
The organizational structure in Defense also provides a functionalism
that does not promote decision making on the basis of life cycle cost. The
concept of life cycle cost is intended to reduce operating and support costs yet,
often in order to do so involves additional spending in the early stages of an
acquisition in R&D and other efforts to improve the reliability and
maintainability of the particular system. The program manager however, has
only finite funds, and must manage his program to acquisition cost and
schedule. Efforts to reduce life cycle cost often run counter to these
requirements. Because the responsibility for program management and the
operation and support of fielded weapon systems are separate, the program
manager has no incentive to take action to reduce operating and support costs
if to do so will run counter to his own interests to manage a program on the
basis of acquisition cost and schedule. This is accentuated because there is no
accountability for the life cycle cost estimate put forward. If a program uses as
justification for its acceptance that it will reduce operating and support costs
by a certain amount over the current capability, there is no requirement to
live up to that estimate. In contrast, programs are held accountable for
acquisition cost estimates.
In an effort to come some way to avoiding these problems, there have
been moves to establish what is colloquially known as a "womb to tomb"
project management organization. In this approach, rather than the program
manager transition a program to functional areas on completion of the
acquisition, he will also have to manage it throughout its service life. This
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concept is currently being applied to manage the CG 47 AEGIS Ship Program.
While this is spoken of enthusiastically in some quarters, it is still too early to
determine if this approach will have any long term effect.
From the stand point of the organization, interest in life cycle cost comes
from two quarters-those who are interested in life cycle cost as an indicator
to general affordability, and those who are interested in the detail of the
reliability, maintainability and supportability tradeoffs that are inherent in
the application of life cycle costing as a concept. The former of these interests
is a budgeteers view of life cycle cost, while the latter is a logisticians. The
functional organization for life cycle cost discussed above is along these lines.
While these are complementary views to the use of life cycle cost, in practice
it is the budgeteers view that dominates. This is evident in the organizations
that make up the review and approval process. The Naval Center for Cost
Analysis and the CAIG are primarily concerned with the estimating
methodology rather than the tradeoffs that should have occurred. In the
reports that a program provides during program review and approval, and in
the System Concept Paper and Decision Co-ordination papers that go to the
DAB, it is a total life cycle cost estimate, arrived at through gross parametric
means that is usually provided. The dominance of the budgeteers view
however, is a major factor in the lack of acceptance of life cycle cost as a basis
on which to make decisions.
The problem with life cycle cost as a budgetary tool, in this authors
opinion, is that it is a role for which the techniques of life cycle cost
estimating are currently not well suited. When used in this way there is an
expectation that the overall estimate will be accurate. This view holds that the
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operating and support estimates be at least as accurate as acquisition cost
estimates if decisions are to be made on the basis of life cycle cost rather than
acquisition cost alone. However, there are two factors mitigating against this.
The first, is that when projecting so far in to the future, so many factors are
likely to change, that the estimate can not with any certainty include these.
The second factor is that the operating and support cost data that is available
does not support accurate estimates. This will be pursued in detail in the
following section. In contrast, the logisticians approach does not require the
same level of accuracy. From the logisticians point of view, what is of interest
are the effects of different design features on cost, rather than an absolute
measure of cost. With the dominance of the budgeteers view, and the
limitations of life cycle cost estimating to provide the accuracy of estimates
demanded, the tendance is to fall back on acquisition cost as the basis for
decisions. Thus commonly, life cycle cost estimating really becomes just a tick
in the box in the acquisition process.
C The VAMOSC System
In 1974 the General Accounting Office (GAO) in their report Life Cycle
Cost Estimating-Its Status and Potential in Major Weapons Systems
Acquisition, found that the lack of operating and support cost data was a
considerable limiting factor to the use of life cycle cost in acquisition. As
discussed in the preceding chapter, data is probably the most important, and at
the same time, most difficult part of life cycle cost analysis. While historical
data for R&D and production costs are usually readily available because of the
tight reporting required of programs in acquisition, and because of contractor
billing during these phases, operating and support cost data does not have the
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same visibility. Shortly after the GAO's comments, and in response to them,
Deputy Secretary for Defense Packard established a management objective for
the Department of Defense to provide a data collection system for operating
and support costs. This became the Visibility and Management of Operating
and Support Cost (VAMOSC) data system.
DODD 7220.33 [Ref. 391 defines the purpose of the VAMOSC to be to:
... permit the development of a well defined, standard presentation of
O&S costs by defense system, including a display of critical logistics
support costs at the subsystem level for existing (fielded) systems.
This directive goes on to specify that
VAMOSC data can be used as a basis for decisions concerning
affordability, budget development, support concepts, cost tradeoffs,
modifications, and retention of current systems.
Each of the Services has their own VAMOSC system. For the Navy,
VAMOSC is in two parts: VAMOSC-Ships and VAMOSC-Air. VAMOSC-
Ships provides a top level cost breakdown by major platform and cost
element. There are two basic cost report formats in VAMOSC-Ships. The first
is the average costs for each element of operating and support costs by ship
type, and the second is the costs for each element of operating and support
costs for the individual ships of a particular type. An example page from each
of these reports is provided in Figures 10 and 11 respectively. To these
VAMOSC-Air adds a third type of report which provides more detailed
maintenance related cost data by work unit code. This is called the VAMOSC
MS or Maintenance Subsystems Report. This type of report is currently not
available in VAMOSC-Ships. [Ref. 40] In addition to the standard report
formats, special purpose reports to varying levels of aggregation and data
combination can be requested from VAMOSC.
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Figure 11. Example of VAMQSC Operating and Support Costs by Ship
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While VAMOSC-Air covers costs to the major system and subsystem
level, VAMOSC-Ships is still primarily platform oriented. Currently
VAMOSC-Ships covers all major ships but only breaks out costs for the
following ships systems:
* AN/BLQ-5 Sonar * 5/54 Caliber Mk 45 Gun
* AN /SLQ-32 EW System 0 5/54 Caliber Mk 42 Gun
* AN/SPS-55 Radar 0 LM 2500 Gas Turbine Engine
* AN/SQS-53 Sonar 0 Mk 117 Fire Control System
* AN/SQS-56 Sonar 0 Harpoon
* ASROC 0 Mk 41 VLS
* CIWS Mk 15 (Phalanx) 0 Mk 26 GMLS
* Combat Control System Mk 1 0 Mk 86 GFCS
9 AN/SPS-49 Radar
VAMOSC is really an umbrella management information system that
draws together data collected from other large decentralized data bases. The
primary purpose of these individual data bases is to provide budgetary
information. The data is sourced from places such as the the shipyards, supply
centers and maintenance depots for ships in service. During acquisition, data
is also collected on new systems through the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA)
process of MILSTD 1388 via the LSA Record (LSAR). In the Navy VAMOSC is
maintained under contract by a company, Information Spectrum Inc.
VAMOSC data is intended to provide the basis for estimating operating
and support costs using any of the techniques discussed in Chapter II.
However, because of the limitations in the level of detail and scope of
coverage with VAMOSC-Ships this places some restrictions on the techniques
used when estimating the costs of ships systems. In all cases, scaling of the
data from analogous hardware is likely to be required to produce the estimate
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[Ref. 41:p. 96]. The use of VAMOSC data to develop operating and support cost
estimates is illustrated in the appendix for the SSN 21 SEAWOLF Submarine,
and the F/A 18 Fighter. The F/A 18 particularly is a good example because
they applied both a top down and a bottom up approach to estimating with
the VAMOSC data.
D. DATA ISSUES
Despite the claim in the VAMOSC individual ships report for 1988 [Ref.
42] that: "the methodology used to collect and display over 84 percent of the
total operating and support costs has been proved valid," many of the people
interviewed by the author expressed concerns at the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of the VAMOSC data. The major shortfall of VAMOSC is
that it is not a true cost accounting system. There are two problems with
VAMOSC's treatment of cost. Firstly, it only deals effectively with purely
direct variable costs. VAMOSC does not capture and allocate all indirect costs
for the systems its reporting on. Secondly, since several major systems are
likely to share maintenance resources, use the same spare parts, and have
common 1: rsonnel operating and maintaining them, there is some question
whether these shared costs are captured at all, and if they are, whether they
also are allocated in correct proportion.
The problem with VAMOSC only capturing direct cost, and this being the
basis of estimates, is that it does not give visibility to any changes in indirect
costs that may occur. The previous chapter discussed the NARM as one way
to determine indirect costs, but as was also discussed, the limitations of this
model mean it is not commonly used. The result is that the impact of indirect
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costs are not always taken into consideration in decision making. If these
were included they may have an impact.
The data problem is not in the VAMOSC system alone, but in the ability
of the Department of Defense as a whole to capture and report cost. This has
recently been brought out in a GAO audit of the Air Force. The criticisms the
GAO made of the Air Force apply at least equally to the other services. As the
GAO noted: "the Air Force is the only military service which has tried to
prepare a set of financial statements" [Ref. 43:p. 21. There is inference that the
other services' accounting systems are in worse shape than the Air Force's,
and that this was why they did not also respond. The GAO found in their
report that
The Air Force has no system to accurately account for billions of dollars
invested in aircraft, missiles and engines. Furthermore Air Force
accounting systems cannot produce the operating and support costs for
weapons systems. [Ref. 43:p. 59]
There were many problems even in the Air Force's ability to accurately
account for the acquisition cost of aircraft. The GAO quotes the case of the B-1
bomber which was reported to have cost $150 million each. The GAO found
the cost to actually be $219 million. [Ref. 43:p. 5]
The GAO had also, several years earlier, tried to undertake a study of the
problem of the increasing operating and support costs of weapons systems in
all of defense. The study however had to be terminated "because data was
unavailable within DOD " [Ref. 44:p. 531 In response, by 1992 each of the
services are supposed to be able to accurately report the operating and support
costs for weapons systems both in the inventory and planned [Ref. 44:p. 531.
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E. COST MODELING ISSUES
The absence of accurate historical cost data calls into question the basis on
which cost models are constructed. All cost models rely to some degree on the
identification of the relationships between cost drivers and costs, whether this
be in the form of cost estimating relationships or mathematical algorithms.
The accuracy of the data has become even more of an issue in recent years
with the increased availability of computer models. In the opinion of Dr
McDonald from OSD PA&E [Ref. 37], one of the problems with computer
models is that they have enabled people to be "intellectually dishonest."
Computers have enabled many more complex problems to be modeled on a
far larger scale than manual techniques would allow. Their complexity, allied
with the fact that the estimates are produced on a computer, has meant that
models are often treated as sacrosanct and their developers experts, with little
questioning of the underlying assumptions or relationships in the models.
These problems can be particularly acute with commercial models where the
algorithms and the construction of the model may be considered proprietary.
The plethora of life cycle cost models and the variety of their uses has also
meant that there is no consistent approach to what constitutes the various
elements of cost, and what the relationships between cost elements are that
should be represented in the models. The CAIG have a published set of cost
definitions, but they are not always followed. One problem with this is that as
a program develops, different models and techniques are applied at different
stages of an equipment's life cycle. Because the definitions and assumptions
of the models are likely to vary, the results generated from one phase of the
life cycle on one model, can not be easily compared to the results generated in
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a different phase using different models and different estimating techniques.
The same problem will occur when different models are used for comparing
different designs at the same phase of an equipment's life cycle, such as in
design tradeoffs or source selection. These problems are further compounded
because the absence of accurate historical data makes it difficult to question
the assumptions and construction of models since there is only limited ability
to compare the forecasted costs of the models with actual data. Ideally, a
model should be judged by its ability to predict the known costs of a similar
system in service. This does not currently occur [Ref. 41.
F. THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF LIFE CYCLE COSTING IN THE U.S.
From the above discussion it would appear that there are many problems
with life cycle costing in the U.S., and that these are inhibiting its effective use
as a decision tool. Life cycle cost analysis does not occur in an environment
that encourages concern for future costs and necessarily takes the results the
analysis seriously into account. There are also major limitations to the
accuracy of the data which calls in to question the basis of life cycle cost
modeling and the results it produces. Successful life cycle cost analysis is a
direct result of managements emphasis and interest in what it has to say
about better solutions to a problem.
However, having said all of this, as is illustrated with the F/A 18 case in
the appendix, there are some examples where life cycle cost has been applied
to make successful decisions in major system acquisition programs. The F/A
18 is often held up as an example of the potential of the application of the life
cycle cost concept. What is interesting and relevant in this case is that it is in
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the role of a design tool, rather than as an affordability tool, that life cycle cost
has been most successfully used.
What then is the future of life cycle cost in the U.S.? The popularity and
emphasis on life cycle cost has ebbed and flowed in the U.S. Department of
Defense over the last 30 years. There was a flurry of interest in the mid 1970's,
but this waned during the 1980's. There appears to be increasing interest
again. The ebbs and flows are largely in inverse response to the changing
political and financial emphasis on defense. In the mid 1970's after the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, the Defense budget became tighter, and their was
emphasis on efficiency, and concern with the costs of operating the current
capability. However, in the 1980's when defense again became political
popular, higher levels of funding were available, and the future costs of
operating the hardware acquired was of less concern. In the 1990's, with the
Gramm-Rudman Act requiring a balanced Federal budget, the Department of
Defense are going to have to cut $167 billion from its budget between 1990 and
1992 [Ref.451. The reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, which have
lessened world tensions, are also having a significant effect on the political
priority of defense. In this environment the future consequences of present
day decision are likely to be of increasing concern to the Defense decision
makers. Life cycle cost as a means to measure these consequences, and as a
btsis on which to make decisions favorable to reduced resource use in the
future, is likely to receive renewed emphasis. Ultimately, the improvements
of Defense financial accounting systems being forced by Congress, should
result in improved accuracy and credibility of life cycle cost estimates such
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that they will support the increased acceptance and use of the technique and
concept of life cycle cost as a decision tool.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has placed life cycle cost into the context of its use in the U.S.
Department of Defense by exploring the regulations that govern weapons
system acquisition, design to cost, integrated logistic support, and source
selection; and by looking at the major organizations within Defense and the
Navy in particular who have an interest in life cycle cost as a decision making
tool. While the regulations and organizations do give life cycle cost some
attention, they are do not do so consistently, and in practice it is acquisition
cost that is most often the major cost consideration in decision making. A
variety of reasons have been identified as causes for this. Not the least of
these is that institutionally, the emphasis is on the acquisition of new
equipment, rather than the costs to operate and support it. This is promoted
by an organization that functionally separates acquisition and through life
support, and by a system that assesses a program manager on his ability to
manage a program within acquisition cost and schedule, when to achieve life
cycle cost savings may involve addition costs in R&D and production.
Institutionally, life cycle cost is largely the purview of budgeteers, and it is
this view that has, for the most part, dominated life cycle cost in the U.S. But
with the current state of the data, life cycle cost is least suited to this
application. Life cycle cost has been most successfully applied as design and
logistics support tool, where complete data is less important to decision
making.
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The VAMOSC system's major limitations for cost estimating are: its
accuracy; that for ships it is still primarily platform oriented; and that it only
captures direct costs. As such it is not a true cost accounting system that
provides all the data necessary for decision making. However, with
Congressional pressure being applied to the Department of Defense to
develop accounting systems that will reflect the true costs of operating and
support of the current capability, life cycle cost is likely to become more
credible as a decision making tool. With the prospect of decreasing defense
budgets there is also likely to be increased concern for the costs of operating
and support of new acquisitions, in which case, life cycle cost will also receive
renewed interest.
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IV. THE APPLICATION OF LIFE CYCLE COSTING TO THE AUSTRALIAN
DEFENSE FORCES
This study has highlighted some of the issues and problems with life cycle
cost as it is practiced in the U.S. In this chapter the conclusions from the
examination of life cycle cost in the U.S. will be applied to discuss the broad
issues in the application of life cycle cost analysis to the decision making of
the Australian Defense Forces (ADF). It is not intended in this chapter to
conduct a detailed examination of the decision making process in the ADF,
discuss current ADF policies and procedures, nor provide an in depth step by
step procedure to implement life cycle costing. Rather, this chapter will briefly
identify some of the key issues, and clarifying some misconceptions with the
application of life cycle costing to Australia. The purpose of this chapter is to
allow the ADF to benefit from the U.S. experience in using of life cycle costing
for almost 30 years.
A. BACKGROUND
While life cycle cost is not a totally new concept to the ADF, it has been
rarely practiced. This does not mean that decisions in acquisition favorable to
reduced life cycle cost have not been made. Rather, in most cases decisions
have been made without the quantification of their life cycle cost impact. The
consideration of cost in acquisition decisions usually concerns only
acquisition cost. The directive by the Chief of Defense Force Staff, referred to
in the introduction to this study, that life cycle cost be used "in the decision
making process associated with the acquisition of equipments and weapon
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systems," is intended to formalize the consideration of life cycle cost rather
than simply acquisition cost in acquisition decisions.
B. THE AUSTRALIAN ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
The Australian acquisition process is similar to the U.S. process described
in Chapter IMI. Its starting point is the identification of a need in the Defence
Force Capabilities Guidelines Paper, which is then translated to a Capability
Proposal by the Service's. Subject to endorsement, a program will be
approved and progress through milestones in a similar manner to the process
described for U.S. major system acquisitions.
A significant difference in the approach to acquisition between Australia
and the U.S. however is that, for the most part, the Concept
Demonstration/Validation and Full Scale Development Phases are usually
passed over. As a nation with a comparatively small defense force, Australia
commonly buys an existing design of military equipment which is already in
an advanced stage of development or in actual production. Depending on the
program, this may be a complete system or a platform upon which other
existing systems are integrated. There are however exceptions to this. The
Mulloka sonar and Minehunting catamaran for example, were fully
developed in Australia.
In the 1970's and early 1980's major systems acquisition was characterized
by the purchase of complete platforms from the U.S. Government under
Foreign Military Sales agreements. Recently there has been a shift away from
Foreign Military Sales to direct commercial procurement from the U.S. and
other Western world countries. This is particularly true of the Navy, where
currently the two highest profile Navy programs are the New Submarine and
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ANZAC Frigate projects, which are of European commercial design.
Increasingly, the selected systems will be co-produced in Australia.
C. THE USES FOR LIFE CYCLE COST IN AUSTRALIA
As a nation with a comparatively small defense force Australia also
usually procures only small quantities of hardware for its military
acquisitions. Because of this, when an existing design is sought, there is only a
limited ability for Australia to influence the design in favour of reduced life
cycle costs. There is however, considerable scope to select amongst competing
existing designs on the basis of life cycle cost. In those few instances that the
designs are commissioned by the ADF, there is also the capability to set design
to life cycle cost goals and thresholds, and to conduct trade studies on the basis
of life cycle cost criteria. Thus, although the environment and scale may be
slightly different than the U.S., the potential uses of life cycle cost are
essentially the same. To repeat these, life cycle costs uses are for:
* affordability,
9 source Selection and evaluation,
9 logistics support analysis, and to a lesser extent
* detailed design.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
Although there are exceptions such as with the F/A 18, the U.S. has, on
the whole, had only limited success with the use of life cycle cost. It is
however, still acknowledged that life cycle cost is a fundamentally better
approach to making decisions during acquisition than acquisition cost alone.
This study has highlighted that institutional problems and a lack of credibility
are some of the principle reasons for the problems experienced with the
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application of life cycle cost in the U.S. Part of the problem in the U.S. has
been overcoming the institutional inertia that in practice puts the acquisition
of new equipment ahead of the costs to operate and support it. Change,
particularly changes in institutional attitudes is a difficult thing to
accomplish. As Franklin Roosevelt commented about the U.S. Navy:
To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You
punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are
finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before
you started. [Ref. 46:p. 320]
If Australia is to avoid the futility of punching a feather bed, then there
needs to a fundamental shift in attitudes to accord decisions favorable to
reducing the costs of operation and support real management priority.
Some of the reasons why in the U.S. life cycle cost is not given real
emphasis in acquisition decisions are partly moderated in the case of
Australia. As a result of recent reorganizations in the Defense Department,
the Supply, Engineering and Materiel Divisions have been amalgamated in
each of the Services. Thus, the acquisition and operating and support
functions are not as separated as they once were. However the project
manager is still judged on meeting acquisition costs and staying on schedule,
and the budgeting and political process in Australia, like the U.S., places
considerably more emphasis on the funds to be spent in the near term rather
than the long term. In this situation there needs to be higher level
management realization of what life cycle cost is intended to achieve, and
emphasis on it. In this authors opinion, the U.S. have largely only paid lip
service to life cycle cost. Therefore while the regulations exist that say life
cycle cost should be used, this is not followed in practice. This needs to be
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avoided in Australia if the ADF are to make full use of the potential of a life
cycle cost management approach.
In the U.S. life cycle cost suffers because the predominance of the
budgeteers view of life cycle cost for affordability. Yet, as discussed, this is a
very limited use for life cycle cost analysis, and one which the current state of
data in the U.S. does not readily support. It is unlikely that Australia will find
it any more useful than the U.S. has, except to compare on a broad scale of
affordability, very different approaches to meet a mission need. Therefore
institutionally what needs to be emphasized are the other, more valuable
uses for life cycle cost analysis.
To achieve this, life cycle cost should not become the purview of
budgeteers alone. Rather the logistics and design directorates need to have
specific responsibilities for life cycle cost in the acquisition process, and the
institutional support to ensure it is considered. Organizationally, it is probably
more appropriate that one of these areas be responsible for life cycle cost in
each of the services, since it is in these areas that the most benefits will occur
from the use of a life cycle cost approach.
E. DATA
For life cycle cost to be accorded management attention it needs to be a
credible decision making tool. The principle determinant of this is the
accuracy and availability of the data. As discussed in Chapter II, data for life
cycle cost analysis is fundamentally of three types: resource data, the physical
and performance characteristics of the system being analyzed, and program
data on utilization and deployment. Since Australia's systems are usually
acquired in an advanced stage of development or production, the physical
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and performance parameters of the system are commonly known. While
these figures may only be estimates, there are contractual mechanisms that
can be used to ensure that the contractor's estimates are reasonable. Like the
U.S., the largest single difficulty that Australia is likely to face in trying to
establish life cycle cost, is in capturing the resource data for the operating and
support costs of current systems to be used in the analysis.
It is the resource costs associated with the user's environment which are
the most difficult because of the problems of capturing all relevant direct
costs, and allocating indirect costs. The problems the U.S. are experiencing
with this, and the shortfalls in current U.S. data collection systems have been
discussed in detail. However, because the U.S. are having difficulty with data
collection is no excuse to write off life cycle cost for Australia. The job of
capturing and allocating cost is fundamentally easier in Australia because of
the comparatively smaller scale of Australia's operations. There are fewer
classes of weapons systems, fewer repair facilities, and therefore fewer
common costs. To develop an accounting system that can provide accurate
and complete data for life cycle cost purposes is not insurmountable. In
commercial enterprise, where the capturing of cost is essential to pricing
decisions, successful accounting systems have been developed at reasonable
cost. A further point to consider is that without an accurate accounting system
fully informed decisions, whether they be for life cycle cost analysis or any
other purpose, cannot be made. Thus, a desirable effect of developing an
accounting system for the purpose of life cycle cost is its potential for use in
other management decisions.
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There have been some suggestions that, at least initially, Australia could
obtain U.S. data, under Foreign Military Sales or other arrangements, for life
cycle cost analysis purposes. This however, would be of limited value
particularly for the elements of operation and support costs even for common
systems. Because of the often very different maintenance and operating
environments between the two countries, costs are likely to be considerably
different. For example, it can not be assumed that because it cost a certain
amo. + + to repair a component in the U.S., that it will cost the same amount
if it is repaired in Australia. A possible approach to reflect the differences
between the operating and support environments of Australia and the U.S., is
to apply a scaling factor to the data. However, this approach will still only give
data of limited accuracy because of the problem of determining what the
scaling factor should be. Without knowledge of the real costs of operation and
support in the Australian environment an appropriate scaling factor will be
impossible to accurately determine. Also, because Australia is increasingly
looking beyond the U.S. for weapons system purchases, common systems are
not always going to be available.
As the discussion of life cycle cost in the U.S. has shown, the absence of
accurate data upon which to base life cycle cost analysis is a major stumbling
block to the credibility of the analysis. Without credibility, management are
less likely to make decisions based on the analysis. This is particularly so
when there are other institutional and cultural factors which continue to
accord acquisition cost and schedule priority over the life cycle cost of a
weapon system. Thus in many respects the cornerstone of life cycle cost
analysis is accurate data.
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F. LIFE CYCLE COST MODELS AND METHODOLOGY
As was discussed in Chapter II there are a plethora of life cycle cost models
available in the US. alone. When to these are added the many more that are
available from other countries, the choice is next to endless. Out of all these
models, Australia can not expect to find one ideal life cycle cost model, that
will fulfill all life cycle cost analysis needs. The diversity of use and
application of life cycle cost analysis is reflected in the diversity of models. As
was pointed out by the Director of the U.S. Air Force Working Group's study
of available life cycle cost models:
Some have suggested that one or a small number of ideal life cycle cost
model developed by a select group of specialists would provide the
analysis methods needed to address most or all Air Force life cycle cost
problems. However, quite the reverse is true. [Ref. 22:p. 1]
The selection of a model or models will largely depend on what the
purpose of the analysis is, and at what stage in the life cycle the analysis is
conducted. Any model to be selected should be simple enough to be
understood, and easily implemented, yet allow for sufficient detail to
reasonably model the problem it is being used to solve. A note of caution on a
fundamental principle of modeling is that the model should be selected to
reflect the problem, not the problem framed in terms that will suit the
available model.
As an approach to life cycle costing methodology, Australia is likely to
find the life support cost approach to life cycle costing discussed in Chapter II,
rather than a total life cycle cost approach to analysis, holds most potential
use. This approach knows the acquisition cost and therefore focuses on the
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cost impact of the design on the logistics elements. The Swedish defense
forces have also been using the life support cost approach to life cycle cost for
source selection and logistics tradeoffs for many years with success. While to
go into this in depth is outside the scope of this study, the reader is referred to
an excellent example of the Swedish application of life cycle cost in a paper,
LCC Case Study of A Major Ground Radar System, by Kargaard and Waak.
[Ref. 471
G. LIFE CYCLE COSTING MANAGEMENT
Paramount to the successful management of life cycle costing is the clear
understanding that life cycle cost is to be a major consideration in acquisition
decisions. This has to be communicated to Defense management and to
outside contractors who are tendering their system for Defense acquisition.
Porter has suggested that one way to ensure that the Program Manager
considers life cycle cost is for the mandatory inclusion of a life cycle cost
management plan in the acquisition strategy [Ref. 48:p. 87]. Thus, forcing the
Program Manager to give early consideration to life cycle cost, and the way life
cycle cost analysis will be conducted. However, this does not abrogate the need
for higher management cammitment and support for what life cycle cost is
intended to achieve, nor to ensure that it occurs.
One way to ensure that contractors understand the importance of life
cycle cost is by having life cycle cost requirements included in all Requests for
Proposal (RFP). This requires a clear statement that life cycle cost will be a
high priority source selection criteria. Butler and Neeches have suggested the
following as an example of the wording that might be included in the RFP to
convey this:
77
Life-cycle cost is considered to be the greatest concern in the
procurement. Proposed designs will not be considered solely on the basis
of their acquisition cost, but also on the likelihood that they will exhibit
low operation and support cost. It is the Government's intention to
procure a design which economizes on all resources, both current and
future. To this end, minimization of the cost of individual resources
(e.g., manpower or support and test equipment) is deemed unacceptable:
instead the designer shall accept responsibility for minimization of total
life cycle cost. This requirement shall be considered satisfied by the
integration of life cycle cost analysis in the design process. Appended to
this solicitation are all materials required to carry out such analysis, as
part of the design process. While bidders are not required to use these
materials, they should recognize that the government intends to use
them in the source selection process and that the requirement for their
use shall be included in any contract which may arise from this
solicitation. [Ref. 48:p. 891
However, even specifying in the RFP the importance of life cyc'e cost may
not necessarily achieve the desired response. In the paper, LCC Case Study of
A Major Ground Radar System, [Ref. 47] cited above, the Swedes found with
their procurement of the S-3D ground radar, it was beneficial to establish
several rounds of the RFP process. In this approach, they fed back to the
respondents information on where their original responses were deficient
from a life cycle cost point of view. There was then an opportunity to respond
a second time. The success of this method is evident when it is realized that
ITT Gilfillan who by their own admission were possibly the worst contender
from a life cycle cost point of view in the first round, won the contract on the
basis of life cycle cost on their second attempt.
From the perspective of source selection, there are two possible
approaches to selecting a system on the basis of life cycle cost. The first is to
have the contractors conduct their own estimates using a specified model,
with resource data provided by the government. The other approach is for the
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competing contractors to provide the physical and performance data for their
system, to enable the program manager to conduct the analysis. This latter
approach is, for example, the way the Swedish approached the S-3D radar
acquisition cited above. Because of the often different definitions of cost
elements in the various models, it is important in source selection that the
same model be used in the comparison, and that the workings of the model
be understood by all those that are making decisions based on its results.
A problem with either approach from the government's stand point is
ensuring that the life cycle cost estimates, or the physical and performance
characteristics, are realistic and going to be achieved. Warranties, reliability
and maintainability guarantees, and incentive and award fee contracts are
methods of ensuring this. An important point in the application of these
methods, is that in the case of award fee contracts the government needs to be
prepared to provide substantial awards for achieving life cycle cost goals, but
also to withhold the award against contractor pressure, if the agreed upon
goals are not met. Similarly, the government needs to be prepared to go to
court if necessary to uphold warranty, guarantee and incentive provisions.
There is no point in giving teeth to life cycle cost goals in acquisition if the
teeth are not used when necessary. There have been occasions when
Australia has been reluctant to use its teeth when contractors have failed to
fulfill obligations in the past.
In summary, successful life cycle cost management requires a clear
understanding that life cycle cost is to be a major determinant of the program.
In the case of contractors, the importance of life cycle cost needs to be spelt out
in the RFP. To ensure accurate instead of optimistic estimates, contractual
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provisions need to be implemented, and there needs to be the will to back
them up when necessary.
H. CHAFER CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has brought together some of the key findings from the
study of life cycle cost in the U.S., to discuss some major points with the
application of life cycle cost in the Australian Defense Forces. These major
points can be summarized as
* For Australia, life cycle cost is likely to be most successful if it is used as a
tool for source selection and logistics analysis rather than for budgetary
purposes. In these roles a life support cost rather than a total life cycle
cost approach to analysis is appropriate.
" For life cycle cost to be successful, the ADF needs to shift attitudes at all
levels to accord decisions favorable to reducing the costs of operation
and support management priority.
" Within each of the Services one organization, probably logistics or
design related, needs to be made responsible for life cycle cost, and
become its advocate.
" Australia needs to develop an accurate accounting system that can be
used for life cycle cost analysis, as well as other management decisions.
" The ADF cannot expect to find one ideal life cycle cost model. Instead
different models will be required for different purposes.
" The importance of life cycle cost in source selection needs to be
communicated to competing contractors. The vehicle for this is the RFP.
" Contractual provisions which the government are prepared to back up
when necessary are essential to ensure realistic life cycle cost estimates.
If the path to life cycle cost analysis seems distant and difficult for the
ADF, it should be remembered that better acquisition decisions are likely to be
made considering life cycle cost than without. Starting from the beginning,
and being able to benefit from the experience of others means that fewer
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mistakes are likely to be made if the lessons learnt from others are
understood and applied.
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V. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study set out with two principle purposes-to examine and reach
conclusions on life cycle costing in the U.S., and to apply these conclusions to
the major issues with implementing life cycle cost analysis in the acquisition
decisions of the Australia Defense Forces. In concert with this, two subsidiary
and a primary research question were posed. The answers to these questions
follow.
1. What Are The Principle Characteristics of Life Cycle Cost Analysis
Approach to Decision Making?
This study has identified, in chapter II, a general analysis approach for
life cycle costing. In the course of this study it has been stressed that life cycle
cost is a decision tool that considers the future consequences of present day
decisions. In this respect life cycle cost is both a concept and a technique. As a
concept it is aimed at reduced costs of ownership over the life cycle of a
system. As a technique it provides an analysis approach to quantify these costs
over the life cycle for the purpose of decision making.
Life cycle cost concerns the tradeoffs of reliability, maintainability, and
supportability-the operating and support cost drivers, with any increases in
R&D and production costs that may result. In this life cycle cost analysis
should be thought of in the larger sense as cost effectiveness analysis.
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2. How and with what Success is Life Cycle Costing Used in the U.S.
Department of Defense, and what Criticisms are there of it?
It has been concluded that life cycle cost has had only limited success
in the U.S. Many of the problems with the application of life cycle cost in the
U.S. stem from a lack of credibility. There is not real management emphasis
on the concept of life cycle cost. Although life cycle cost is given some
attention in the regulations that govern the acquisition of weapons systems,
in practice there is not institutional concern for the future consequences of
present day decisions. In the situation where acquisition and operation and
support are functionally separated, the institutional emphasis is on the
acquisition of new more capable systems within acquisition cost and schedule,
rather than on the costs to operate and maintain them. If life cycle cost
analysis is done by program offices at all, it is usually only as a tick in the box
on the way through the approval process rather than as the basis upon which
any real decisions of consequence are made. The F/A 18 program studied in
the appendix is the exception, that shows the potential of a life cycle cost
approach
Attention to life cycle cost is dissipated in the U.S. because it is the
budgeteers view of life cycle cost as a technique for affordability that
dominates. Yet, it is in this area that life cycle cost has been least successful,
and for which it is least suited. Life cycle cost is most applicable as the criteria
to evaluate and tradeoff logistics and design issues.
The cornerstone of successful life cycle cost analysis is the data. But
the current data system for operation and support costs in the U.S.-the
VAMOSC system, is of limited accuracy. VAMOSC does not capture all costs
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associated with a weapons system. The inadequacy of the Department of
Defense's accounting systems have recently been the subject of considerable
congressional and GAO attention, and it is likely that renewed efforts to
capture and report costs will result in more accurate data, and as a
consequence, better life cycle cost estimates in the future.
3. What are the Essential Issues to Consider in the Applica-
tion of Life Cycle Costing to the Decision Making of the Australian
Defense Forces?
Australia will get most use from a life cycle cost approach to
acquisition if it is used in source selection of competing systems and in
logistics tradeoffs. For this a life support cost approach to life cycle costing is
appropriate, and will simplify the analysis. There is only limited use of the
technique for affordability issues. However, to achieve the full benefit from
life cycle costing requires more than just writing it into the regulations. There
needs to be the acceptance at all levels of the concept of life cycle cost, and
what it is trying to do for decisions of consequence to be made on the basis of
life cycle cost analysis. The key to life cycle cost analysis is the data, and
Australia needs to develop an accounting system that reflects the costs of
operation and support for Australia. This is not insurmountable, and is
fundamentally easier than in the U.S. It will also be valuable for other
decision making purposes.
The major point in Australia's case is that better acquisition decisions
are likely to made with the consideration of life cycle cost than without. Being
able to benefit from the U.S. experience of life cycle cost, Australia has the
opportunity to implement life cycle costing into the decision making of the
84
Australian Defense Forces without many of the problems that have been
experienced in the U.S. over the 30 years that life cycle cost has been in use.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations from this study concern some key points to be
considered in the application of life cycle costing to the decision making of the
Australian Defense Forces. These were listed in the conclusions to Chapter
IV. They are repeated here for consistency.
" For Australia, life cycle cost is likely to be most successful if it is used as a
tool for source selection and logistics analysis rather than for budgetary
purposes. In these roles a life support cost rather than a total life cycle
cost approach to analysis is appropriate.
" For life cycle cost to be successful, the ADF needs to shift attitudes at all
levels to accord decisions favorable to reducing the costs of operation
and support management priority.
" Within each of the Services one organization, probably logistics or
design related, needs to be made responsible for life cycle cost, and
become its advocate.
" Australia needs to develop an accurate accounting system that can be
used for life cycle cost analysis, as well as other management decisions.
" The ADF cannot expect to find one ideal life cycle cost model. Instead
different models will be required for different purposes.
" The importance of life cycle cost in source selection needs to be
communicated to competing contractors. The vehicle for this is the RFP.
" Contractual provisions which the government are prepared to back up
when necessary are essential to ensure realistic life cycle cost estimates.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In the course of researching this study several areas for further research
have been identified. These include:
* An analysis and comparison of major life cycle cost models, both
commercial and government, in order to update the studies done in the
1970s in this area.
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* A review of current accounting systems in the Australian Defense
Forces with a view to incorporating and adding to them to provide a
consolidated operating and support data base for life cycle cost and other
decisions making purposes.
A comparison of the methodology and practice of life cycle cost analysis
in the U.S. with its practice in other countries.
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APPENDIX A. CASE STUDIES OF THE APPLICATION OF LIFE CYCLE COST
A. THE APPLICATION OF LIFE CYCLE COST IN THE THE SSN 21
SUBMARINE PROGRAM 1
1. Introduction
The SSN 21 SEAWOLF nuclear attack submarine is intended to
counter the U.S. Navy's perceived Soviet submarine threat in the early 21st
century. With a submerged displacement of 9150 tons it will not only be larger
than current USN classes of submarines, the SSN637 STURGEON, and
SSN688 LOS ANGELES classes, but is also intended to be faster, quieter, more
heavily armed, and available for greater lengths of time without significant
maintenance. The program has recently been given DAB approval to
commence production. The lead ship is planned for delivery in 1994, and
procurement of a further 28 submarines is planned. The acquisition strategy
of the program is for two shipyards to be in competition throughout the
development phases of the program, with one being selected for the lead ship
and follow-on contracts. Both shipyards have been involved in aspects of the
design through these phases of the program.
1 This case study was compiled from PMS 350's The Seawolf CAIG
Presentation, 6 May 1988 [Ref. 49]; and, a personal interview with Mr F.
Ambross of PMS 350 [Ref. 501 All diagrams have been extracted from these
sources.
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2. Program Objectives and Cost Drivers
From the perspective of life cycle cost, two objectives of the program
are that firstly, the SEAWOLF be available for more operating time during its
life cycle than current USN nuclear submarines; and secondly, that it will cost
comparatively less to operate and support. The major ways these objectives
will be met are by designing for a Submarine Extended Operating Cycle
(SEOC) whereby there will be greater periods of operating time between depot
availabilities. This has already been done with some of the LOS ANGELES
class where a modified SEOC called ESEOC has been used. The effects of this
for the SEAWOLF in comparison to other submarines is illustrated at Figure
12. From this figure it can be seen that for the SEAWOLF the only major
depot overhaul is for refueling, where as for the worst case pre SEOC
submarines there are five or possibly six depot overhauls in the same period.
(The last of these may not be held depending on when the ships will be
decommissioned.) The SEAWOLF is still planned to have eight lesser
Selected Repair Availabilities (SRAs) during its life cycle like both the normal
(SEOC) and modified SEOC (ESEOC) LOS ANGELES class. Additionally, to
help allow a SEOC to be used, a major initiative has been designing the
SEAWOLF for greater accessibility. This has resulted in larger five foot logistic
access hatches, and flow paths being incorporated in the design to enable
equipment to be removed without the ship having to enter dock.
Experience with the LOS ANGELES submarines indicated that depot










submarines. It was also realized that during an availability a considerable
portion of the time was spent in making cuts in the pressure hull to gain
access to allow for removal of equipment. It is estimated that over a 30 year
life cycle, the design initiatives in these areas for the SEAWOLF will gain two
years operating time and save $25 million in operating and support costs
compared to the LOS ANGELES class submarines, and result in an
improvement of five years operating time and save $300 million over the
older STURGEON class submarines. It must be said however, that while the
dollar savings estimated resulted from a formal life cycle cost analysis, the
design decisions did not. Discussion with the program office indicated that
while the designers were aware of the program objectives, the design
decisions were reached based on the experience with the LOS ANGELES class
where, after some changes to the maintenance concept, the modified SEOC
concept was already in place.
3. Overview of Cost Estimating Methodology
Life Cycle cost estimates were developed by the program for the
purposes of CAIG review. The O&S cost estimates will be examined in some
detail. The following is an overview to the estimating methodology for the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement
estimates. The RDT&E estimate's methodology was a combination of
engineering and analogy with other programs. The procurement estimate
methodology was a combination of parametric and analogy techniques. Data
was obtained from shipbuilder's return cost data for other programs with a
factoring applied to reflect anticipated labor market conditions. The data was
applied to learning curves experienced with the TRIDENT program which
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utilized similar modular construction. To the estimates developed in this
way was also added known material costs for Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE), and initial outfitting for repair parts, equipage and
consumables, and other non recurring ILS costs. Existing cost estimating
relationships developed in NAVSEA were used where appropriate.
4. O&S Cost Estimates
The operating and support costs estimated were the recurring costs
required to man, operate, maintain and support the submarine. The non
recurring costs were included by the program in the procurement estimates.
The drivers to operating and support costs were determined to be the
displacement of the submarine, the crew size, and the depot overhaul
maintenance cycle of one refueling overhaul of 18 months duration, and 8
lesser availabilities of 2 months each over a 30 year service life.
The principle source of data for the estimate was VAMOSC- Ships.
Costs were broken down and categorized in accordance with the categories
recorded in VAMOSC, and CAIG guidance. Because VAMOSC does not
include indirect costs, these had to be factored from the Navy Resource Cost
Model (NARM). VAMOSC data was also found to be inadequate for depot
overhaul, SRA, and intermediate maintenance costs. Actual source data was
obtained for these. The recurring costs for the BSY-2 Combat System were
based on the estimates developed by PMS418, the program responsible for it.
On the basis of the data, cost estimating relationships were developed
using multi variate regression analysis. The O&S cost estimates by category
are at Table 3. As a point of comparison, cost estimates were produced for all
components of life cycle cost for the LOS ANGELES AND STURGEON classes
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of submarine using the CERs developed for the SEAWOLF. The program
conducted sensitivity and uncertainty analysis on their estimates, although
the uncertainty analysis is reported as a series of statements rather than
statistical uncertainty.
TABLE 3. SEAWOLF O&S ANNUAL COST ESTIMATE-ALL CATEGORIES
MILLIONS OF FY 1985 DOLLARS
1.0 Direct Unit Cost $5.071
1.1 Personnel (3.094)
1.2 Maintenance (1.827)
1.3 Purchased Services (0.150)
2.0 Submarine IMA Costs $2.361
3.0 Submarine Depot Costs $13.064
3.1 Overhauls (4.224)
3.2 SRAs (2.393)
3.3 Non-Scheduled Repairs (0.830)
3.4 Fleet Modernization (3.773)
3.5 Other Depot (1.375)
3.6 Inactivation (0.469)
4.0 Indirect Costs $ 5.326
4.1 Training (0.350)
4.2 VAMOSC Indirect (0.074)
4.3 Non VAMOSC Indirect (4.902)
BSY-2 Combat System $ 5.334
Support Personnel (0.075)
Recurring procurement (1.926)
Operation & Maintenance (3.333)
Total Annual SEAWOLF O&S Costs $31.156
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S. Analysis
The life cycle cost analysis described here was done for the sole
purpose of CAIG review. As such, its purpose was to address affordability
decisions rather than design or support tradeoffs. These other uses for life
cycle cost analysis had neither been done, nor were they contemplated. From
the programs perspective, the purpose of life cycle cost analysis was to get the
program through milestone reviews by showing higher authority that they
were getting a larger more capable weapon system at less cost than current
capability. The estimating methodology was statistical cost estimating
relationships at a gross level. A bottom up estimate that might better reflect
the characteristics of the design was not intended.
It is interesting to note that although supportability considerations
were of obvious importance in design, the design decisions were made
without reference to life cycle cost. There is little doubt that a design which
can increase maintainability by providing improved access, and reduce
overhaul frequency is going to result in reduced operating and support costs.
For these reasons it was felt by the people spoken to at the program office that
there would have been little benefit in using life cycle cost in the design stage.
Additionally, many of the larger design requirements were mandated, and
the program had little discretion over them. The mandated requirements
were things like, to meet the mission need the design had to be a submarine,
it had to be nuclear powered, and it could have a crew of no more than 134,
there were also significant amounts of GFE which would be furnished and
which the design had to accommodate. However, as will be discussed in the
next case on the F/A 18, there are many issues of detailed design and
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equipment selection that if made on the basis of life cycle cost can result in
significant cost savings over the life cycle. These opportunities were missed
with the SSN-21.
Life cycle cost for logistics tradeoffs was not being done by the
program office or functional areas. One reason was that the program did not
have confidence in the NAVSEA Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) model. It
was, in their opinion, cumbersome and complicated, and required too many
data inputs. Rather, level of repair was being done on the basis of purely
technical factors.
A major issue that was brought out, is that the VAMOSC data was
neither complete nor totally accurate. Discussions with program personnel
indicated that there were many occasions when the VAMOSC data just did
not seem to reflect what the estimators considered to be the real costs. This
was particularly so for intermediate maintenance which appeared in
VAMOSC to be understated by some seven times when compared to actual
workload documents. The program office were also unable to develop a
detailed CER for non-scheduled repair on the basis of the VAMOSC data.
They ended up resorting to a simple averaging of the yearly costs for non-
scheduled repair of the other submarines.
6. Case Conclusion
The purpose of this case study of the SEAWOLF submarine program
is to illustrate some of the issues and problems in a real life cycle cost
estimating procedure. As discussed in the body of this study, this case study is
indicative of many of the issues and problems and attitudes of life cycle cost
in the U.S.
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B. THE F/A 18 HORNET AIRCRAFT
1. Introduction
The F/A 18 HORNET is the U.S. Navy's replacement for F-4 and A-7
aircraft in the fighter escort and light attack roles respectively. 1366 aircraft are
being procured by the U.S. Navy and Marines, and several hundred by the
military forces of other countries, including 75 by the Royal Australian Air
Force. With the F/A 18, the U.S. Navy took what it termed a "New Look" to
acquisition. Concerned about the low in-commission rates of carrier based
aircraft, the high manning levels that were required to support them [Ref.
51:p. 151, and the increasing costs for their operation and support, the Navy
initiated with the F/A 18 program a life cycle cost management approach to
its acquisition. There are several characteristics that differentiate the approach
of the F/A 18 program. These are:
" The establishment of design to life cycle cost goals and thresholds that
were firmly contractually binding.
" The provision of funding for reliability and maintainability
improvements during design.
" The use of award fee contracting provisions to incentive the prime
contractor-McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company, to achieve the
program's life cycle cost, and reliability and maintainability goals.
This brief case study will review the major aspects of the of this
management approach to the F/A 18 acquisition, and examine the life cycle
costing methodology that was used. In so doing it is intended to illustrate the
essential aspects of a successful life cycle costing approach as an adjunct to the
rest of this study.
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2. Program Objectives and Life Cycle Cost Goals
The overall objectives of the program office were to produce a more
capable aircraft that offered significant improvements in life cycle cost over
current capability. The program office developed a life cycle cost baseline and
threshold for the F/A 18, and translated this into maintainability and
reliability goals for the aircraft that were held to be at least as important as
acquisition cost and schedule. The more significant of these goals were:
" A maintenance man-hours per flight hour of 18 hours,
" An engine replacement time of 21 minutes with a crew of four,
" A radar replacement time of 20 minutes with a crew of two,
" A mean time to repair of 1.78 hours,
" A turnaround time of 15 minutes,
" A mean time between maintenance of 0.49 flight hours, and
* An operational readiness rate (inherent availability) of 85 percent. [Ref.
52:p. 31
3. Life Cycle Cost Management
Integral to the management of the F/A 18 program was a close
relationship with McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company. McDonnell were
brought on board to the concept of designing for reduced life cycle cost by the
provision of award fees in the contract. An award fee, unlike a plain
incentive provision in a contract, is at the total discretion of the program
manager to award. Program management, based on their own qualative
criteria, may award the full amount, only some, or none of the available
award. A total award fee of $39 million was available for life cycle cost related
areas in the F/A 18 program. Of this $39 million, $15 million was available for
life cycle cost management, a further $12 million was available if the
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contractor could demonstrate that they exceeded the reliability goals of the
design, and an additional $12 million if they exceeded the maintainability
goals. The award payments were available at six monthly intervals from mid
1976 until 1980.
The $15 million life cycle cost management award was based on
qualative evaluation of the contractors performance in the areas of life cycle
cost reduction, control of subcontractors life cycle cost, meeting the design to
cost goals, and achieving program milestones. [Ref. 53:p. 4041 It is significant
that the prime contractor was expected, and did, use part of its award fees to
incentivize subcontractors to meet their own reliability, maintainability and
life cycle cost goals.
To track McDonnell's performance, a schedule of testing and
reporting was introduced. Amongst the various reports required were life
cycle cost status reports. The life cycle cost status reports presented the current
life cycle cost estimates in relation to the baseline, and an explanation of any
variances. They also projected a life cycle cost trend in relation to what was
achieved relative to the baseline. [Ref. 3:p. 408] Through the course of the
program the baseline was changed on several occasions due to changes in the
Navy's operational profile for the aircraft.
4. Development of the Program's Life Cycle Cost Estimates
Cost estimates were developed by the program office for two reasons:
for the purpose of CAIG and DAB review, and as the cost baseline discussed
above, on which the contractors performance relative to life cycle cost could
be evaluated. As in the SSN-21 case, this case will concentrate on the
operating and support cost estimating procedure.
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Because for the F/A 18 the purpose of the cost estimates were more
than just to get the program through the review process, the estimating
methodology had to reflect the unique design sensitive factors. For this
reason the program office approached the task of estimating operating and
support cost in a different way than did the SSN-21 in the previous case study.
The program's estimating methodology used two models. Firstly,
there was a top level accounting model that organized and categorized costs
according to the cost element structure preferred by the CAIG and published
in their cost estimating guidance. Feeding into this was a second model that
the program termed a "factors model." For the top down estimating approach
the factors model used statistically derived cost estimating relationships. For
the bottom up approach the factors were arrived at by simple algorithms, but
developed at a detailed level. In each case, the resulting factors were applied
in the top level model to categorize the costs to the accepted cost element
structure. The relationship between the models and the estimating
techniques is illustrated in Figure 13. Whether the factors were derived from
CERs or from the bottom up techniques, they were intended to reflect the
design characteristics of the aircraft. The top down CERs were driven by
design parameters such as reliability, maintainability, flyaway cost, and weight
[Ref. 54:p. 271 The bottom up estimate, from the subsystem level, utilized cost
data obtained from analogous systems and, and after appropriate scaling,
applied it to repair frequency and maintainability estimates obtained from the
contractor and through logistic support analysis (LSA). In general costs were
developed on a cost per maintenance action basis, which was then adjusted by
the maintenance actions per flight hour. [Ref. 54:p. 28] An example
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comparison of the CER and bottom up algorithm for component rework costs
is at Figure 14. For the bottom up approach the algorithm is applied to each of
the subsystems. The principle source of data for both the top down and
bottom up estimates was VAMOSC-Air. The bottom up estimate utilized the
Statistical
Parametric Cost Factor Top Level





Figure 13. The F/A 18 Costing Process [Ref. 54:p. 211
CER Model
Component Rework Cost = 105.673 + 31.918 {0.74 (AF) + (AV + PROP))
Where:
AF = Air Frame Cost in mililons of dollars
AV + PROP = Avionics System Cost + Propulsion System Cost in
millions of dollars
EW = Empty Weight in thousands of pounds
MFHBH = Mean Flight Hours between Failure
Vmax = Aircraft Maximum Speed in knots
Bottom Up Model
Component Rework Cost Per Aircraft Per Year = $/FH x 360 FH/AC/yr
and $/FH = $ MA x MA/FH
Where:
FH = Flight Hours
MA = Maintenance Actions
* $/MA is derived from fleet data for analogous systems. The costs are
normalized from 2, 4, and 5 digit data from VAMOSC.
Figure 14. F/A 18 Component Rework Cost Factors Derivation [Ref. 54:p. 33]
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VAMOSC Maintenance Subsystem data available in VAMOSC-Air to the 5
digit work unit code level.
5. The Application of Life Cycle Cost Analysis to the Design
Life cycle cost analysis was not only used for program review and as
one of the means to measure the improvements in reliability and
maintainability, but it was itself the basis upon which design decisions were
made by the contractor. Throughout the design of the F/A 18 some 700 trade
studies using life cycle cost criteria were conducted. Some of the more
significant of these were: the decision to not allow the wing pylon assembly to
be jettisoned with the tanks and armament racks should it be necessary to
jettison external stores, even though there was a weight and performance
penalty; a flight control simplification study that resulted in significant cost
and weight savings; and the decision to have a common wheel and tire fit
across the fighter and attack configurations of the aircraft, even though to do
so resulted in some performance degradation, but was estimated to save some
$7.455 million per aircraft over the life cycle. [Ref. 53:p. 407] All in all,
approximately two thirds of the F/A 18's subsystems were designed or
redesigned on the basis of reliability, maintainability and life cycle cost
criteria. [Ref. 55:p. 411
6. The Success of the F/A 18's Life Cycle Cost Program
The application of a life cycle cost approach to the F/A 18 acquisition
resulted in significant reliability and maintainability growth in the aircraft
design. Compared to earlier aircraft the F/A 18 is demonstrating twice the
reliability [Ref. 55:p. 43], and requires between 32 and 62 less squadron
personnel for its operation and support than the capability it replaces
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[Ref. 53:p. 408]. In comparison with the A-7 and F-4, savings in operation and
support costs are estimated to be in the order of $3.981 billion over a 20 year
life cycle [Ref. 53 :p. 4071. For their efforts McDonnell Douglas received 68
percent of the $12 million award available for reliability, 94 percent of the $12
million for maintainability, and 51 percent of the $15 million for life cycle cost
management. [Ref. 53:p. 408]
7. Case Conclusions
In the F/A 18 case, life cycle costing was applied as a concept and as a
technique with great success. It was not just something that the program
office did to get the required tick in the box on the way through the approval
process. Rather, real decisions were made on the basis of life cycle cost.
Decisions that might otherwise not have been made. This contrasts with the
SSN-21 where life cycle cost estimation was largely done because it had to be
for programi approval. The F/A 18 program office approached the acquisition
with life cycle cost as the primary consideration. In the trade studies, if
significant life cycle cost savings could be achieved the opportunity was taken,
even if it meant slight degradations in performance or weight penalties. In
their estimating methodology the program office sought to have estimates
that would truly reflect the design characteristics of the aircraft. This was
probably a more difficult approach, but one that was necessary given the high
priority of life cycle cost in design. In much of the general life cycle cost
literature the F/A 18 program is held up as an example of the potential of life
cycle cost in acquisition. This is justified given the success of the life cycle cost
approach in this program.
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